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    Where would you verify that?<br>
    <br>
    <div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 2/3/2015 10:03 AM, Brian Erdelyi
      wrote:<br>
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      cite="mid:CB45FC36-3B3E-486D-95FE-596D7380C3D2@gmail.com"
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      Joel,
      <div class=""><br class="">
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      <div class="">The mobile device should show you the details of the
        transaction (i.e. amount and bitcoin address).  Once you verify
        this is the intended recipient and amount you approve it on the
        mobile device.  If the address was replaced, you should see this
        on the mobile device as it won’t match where you were intending
        to send it.  You can then not provide the second signature.</div>
      <div class=""><br class="">
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      <div class="">Brian Erdelyi</div>
      <div class=""><br class="">
        <div>
          <blockquote type="cite" class="">
            <div class="">On Feb 2, 2015, at 4:57 PM, Joel Joonatan
              Kaartinen &lt;<a moz-do-not-send="true"
                href="mailto:joel.kaartinen@gmail.com" class="">joel.kaartinen@gmail.com</a>&gt;
              wrote:</div>
            <br class="Apple-interchange-newline">
            <div class="">
              <div dir="ltr" class="">If the attacker has your desktop
                computer but not the mobile that's acting as an
                independent second factor, how are you then supposed to
                be able to tell you're not signing the correct
                transaction on the mobile? If the address was replaced
                with the attacker's address, it'll look like everything
                is ok.
                <div class=""><br class="">
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                <div class="">- Joel<br class="">
                  <div class="gmail_extra"><br class="">
                    <div class="gmail_quote">On Mon, Feb 2, 2015 at 9:58
                      PM, Brian Erdelyi <span dir="ltr" class="">&lt;<a
                          moz-do-not-send="true"
                          href="mailto:brian.erdelyi@gmail.com"
                          target="_blank" class="">brian.erdelyi@gmail.com</a>&gt;</span>
                      wrote:<br class="">
                      <blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0
                        0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc
                        solid;padding-left:1ex"><span class=""><br
                            class="">
                          &gt; Confusing or not, the reliance on
                          multiple signatures as offering greater
                          security than single relies on the
                          independence of multiple secrets. If the
                          secrets cannot be shown to retain independence
                          in the envisioned threat scenario (e.g. a
                          user's compromised operating system) then the
                          benefit reduces to making the exploit more
                          difficult to write, which, once written,
                          reduces to no benefit. Yet the user still
                          suffers the reduced utility arising from
                          greater complexity, while being led to believe
                          in a false promise.<br class="">
                          <br class="">
                        </span>Just trying to make sure I understand
                        what you’re saying.  Are you eluding to that if
                        two of the three private keys get compromised
                        there is no gain in security?  Although the
                        likelihood of this occurring is lower, it is
                        possible.<br class="">
                        <br class="">
                        As more malware targets bitcoins I think the
                        utility is evident.  Given how final Bitcoin
                        transactions are, I think it’s worth trying to
                        find methods to help verify those transactions
                        (if a user deems it to be high-risk enough)
                        before the transaction is completed.  The
                        balance is trying to devise something that users
                        do not find too burdensome.<br class="">
                        <div class="HOEnZb">
                          <div class="h5"><br class="">
                            Brian Erdelyi<br class="">
------------------------------------------------------------------------------<br
                              class="">
                            Dive into the World of Parallel Programming.
                            The Go Parallel Website,<br class="">
                            sponsored by Intel and developed in
                            partnership with Slashdot Media, is your<br
                              class="">
                            hub for all things parallel software
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                            studies, tutorials and more. Take a<br
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                            look and join the conversation now. <a
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                              target="_blank" class="">http://goparallel.sourceforge.net/</a><br
                              class="">
_______________________________________________<br class="">
                            Bitcoin-development mailing list<br class="">
                            <a moz-do-not-send="true"
                              href="mailto:Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net"
                              class="">Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net</a><br
                              class="">
                            <a moz-do-not-send="true"
                              href="https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development"
                              target="_blank" class="">https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development</a><br
                              class="">
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      <pre wrap="">------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Dive into the World of Parallel Programming. The Go Parallel Website,
sponsored by Intel and developed in partnership with Slashdot Media, is your
hub for all things parallel software development, from weekly thought
leadership blogs to news, videos, case studies, tutorials and more. Take a
look and join the conversation now. <a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="http://goparallel.sourceforge.net/">http://goparallel.sourceforge.net/</a></pre>
      <br>
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      <pre wrap="">_______________________________________________
Bitcoin-development mailing list
<a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net">Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net</a>
<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development">https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development</a>
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