<p dir="ltr"><br>
Den 12 feb 2015 16:42 skrev "Mike Hearn" <<a href="mailto:mike@plan99.net">mike@plan99.net</a>>:<br>
> Remember that you aren't paying the bad pool, the bad pool is paying you. Whichever pool benefits from the scorched earth protocol can simply pick an address out of the transaction it perceived as starting the protocol, and pay that.</p>
<p dir="ltr">My counterargument: with zero-conf but no replace-by-fee scorched earth, there would instead be a market which thieves use where pools would offer to execute doublespends that pay the thief and the pool, and where the pools would set what terms and payouts they ask for.</p>
<p dir="ltr">All bidding pools with acceptable terms get a doublespend transaction that pays that specific pool and the thief, the first to mine theirs win (and the merchant loses). </p>
<p dir="ltr">Your protocol requires less setup, but that's the only notable difference (besides risk of paying non-participating pools with scorched earth).</p>
<p dir="ltr">No notable difference in security for merchants. </p>