<html><head><meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html charset=us-ascii"></head><body style="word-wrap: break-word; -webkit-nbsp-mode: space; -webkit-line-break: after-white-space;"><div>Ultimately, a self-interested miner will chose to build on the block that leaves the most transaction fees up for grabs. (This usually means the smallest block.) It's an interesting question whether the default behavior for Core should be the rational behavior (build on the "smallest" block in terms of fees) or some other supposedly altruistic behavior (most BTCDD). This also applies to the decision of the "same time" threshold -- a selfish miner will not care if the blocks arrived at about the same time or not.</div><div><br></div><div>I currently do not have a strong opinion on what that behavior should be, although if the blocksize limit were increased substantially, I may prefer the selfish behavior because it ends up also being fail-safe (punishes selfish mining using large blocks or fee-stealing attempts).</div><div><br></div><br><div><div>On Dec 29, 2015, at 10:59 AM, Dave Scotese via bitcoin-dev <<a href="mailto:bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org">bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org</a>> wrote:</div><br class="Apple-interchange-newline"><blockquote type="cite"><div dir="ltr"><div>There have been no decent objections to altering the block-selection mechanism (when two block solutions appear at nearly the same time) as described at <br><br><a href="http://bitcoin.stackexchange.com/questions/39226">http://bitcoin.stackexchange.com/questions/39226</a><br><br></div>Key components are:<br><ul><li>Compute BitcoinDaysDestroyed using only transactions that have been in your mempool for some time as oBTCDD ("old BTCDD").</li><li>Use "nearly the same time" to mean separated in time by your guess of the average duration of block propagation times.<br></li><li>When two block solutions come in at nearly the same time, build on the one that has the most oBTCDD, rather than the one that came in first.</li></ul><p>The goal of this change is to reduce the profitability of withholding block solutions by severely reducing the chances that a block solved a while ago can orphan one solved recently. "Came in first" seems more easily gamed than "most oBTCDD". As I wrote there, "<em>old coins</em> is always a dwindling resource and <em>global nodes willing to help cheat</em> is probably a growing one."<br></p><p>I will write a BIP if anyone agrees it's a good idea.<br></p></div><div class="gmail_extra"><br><div class="gmail_quote">On Mon, Dec 28, 2015 at 12:26 PM, Ivan Brightly via bitcoin-dev <span dir="ltr"><<a href="mailto:bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org" target="_blank">bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org</a>></span> wrote:<br><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div dir="ltr"><div class="gmail_extra"><div class="gmail_quote"><span class=""><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex">On Mon, Dec 28, 2015 at 2:12 PM, Peter Todd via bitcoin-dev <span dir="ltr"><<a href="mailto:bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org" target="_blank">bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org</a>></span> wrote:<br>
Far more concerning is network propagation effects between large and<br>
small miners. For that class of issues, if you are in an environemnt<br>
where selfish mining is possible - a fairly flat, easily DoS/sybil<br>
attacked network topology - the profitability difference between small<br>
and large miners even *without* attacks going on is a hugely worrying<br>
problem. OTOH, if you're blocksize is small enough that propagation time<br>
is negligable to profitability, then selfish mining attacks with <30%<br>
hashing power aren't much of a concern - they'll be naturally defeated<br>
by anti-DoS/anti-sybil measures.<br></blockquote><div><br></div></span><div>Let's agree that one factor in mining profitability is bandwidth/network reliability/stability. Why focus on that vs electricity contracts or vertically integrated chip manufacturers? Surely, sufficient network bandwidth is a more broadly available commodity than <$0.02/kwh electricity, for example. I'm not sure that your stranded hydroelectric miner is any more desirable than thousands of dorm room miners with access to 10gbit university connections and free electricity.</div></div></div></div>
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<br></blockquote></div><br><br clear="all"><br>-- <br><div class="gmail_signature"><div dir="ltr">I like to provide some work at no charge to prove my value. Do you need a techie? <br>I own <a href="http://www.litmocracy.com/" target="_blank">Litmocracy</a> and <a href="http://www.memeracing.net/" target="_blank">Meme Racing</a> (in alpha). <br>I'm the webmaster for <a href="http://www.voluntaryist.com/" target="_blank">The Voluntaryist</a> which now accepts Bitcoin.<br>I also code for <a href="http://dollarvigilante.com/" target="_blank">The Dollar Vigilante</a>.<br>"He ought to find it more profitable to play by the rules" - Satoshi Nakamoto</div></div>
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