<div dir="auto">The easiest way to think about this is, difficulty is a measure of how long your rig takes to mine a block, and until the first difficulty adjustment, <b>both chains will have identical difficulty!</b> Ea<span style="font-family:sans-serif">ch will take equally long to mine. So</span> <i>regardless</i> of overall hashrate split, a miner's short-term incentive is to just mine the coin with the higher price.<div dir="auto"><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">In the longer run, difficulty will adjust so that each chain is producing 10-minute blocks, and the steady state will be where hashrate ratio follows price ratio. Eg, if B1X price stays 4x B2X, then the short-term-incentive steady state will be where B1X has 4x the difficulty and 80% of hashrate: ie, "mining B1X is a lottery you win 4x less often, with a prize 4x as valuable."</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">But immediately post-split, short-term incentives may not dominate. Many miners don't sell immediately, so long-term price will influence them too. This could benefit either B2X, if low tx rate/high fees make B1X unusable and users shift to B2X; or B1X, if miners foresee B1X's price rising when it makes it to the difficulty adjustment(s) & becomes usable again. As Adam said, higher tx fees may also give B1X an edge with miners (if people are sending...).</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">In short, I think people overstate the short-term incentives - many miners are in this for the long haul - but the post-split short-term incentive is simple and <i>independent</i> of hashrate distribution: just mine the coin with the higher price.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div></div></div><div class="gmail_extra"><br><div class="gmail_quote">On Oct 24, 2017 1:01 PM, "David A. Harding via Bitcoin-segwit2x" <<a href="mailto:bitcoin-segwit2x@lists.linuxfoundation.org">bitcoin-segwit2x@lists.linuxfoundation.org</a>> wrote:<br type="attribution"><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">On Tue, Oct 24, 2017 at 09:27:37AM -0700, Erik Voorhees via Bitcoin-segwit2x wrote:<br>
> So if you consider it from a $ revenue per day:<br>
> - 1x finds 28.8 blocks per day (0.2x144) and earns 360 BTC1x, or $1.44m per<br>
> day ($4,000 x 360)<br>
> - 2x finds 115.2 blocks per day (0.8x144) and earns 1440 BTC2x, or $1.44m<br>
> per day ($1,000 x 1,440)<br>
><br>
> Am I missing something?<br>
<br>
Umm, yeah. 2x did four times as much work to make the same amount of<br>
money as 1x. By, "work", I of course mean that they expended four times<br>
as much electricity and tied up four times as much capital equipment.<br>
<br>
Maybe this isn't obvious since you're treating 1x miners and 2x miners<br>
as a group, but if you consider them as individual miners, it becomes<br>
clear that there's a strong incentive to defect to the more profitable<br>
chain. For example:<br>
<br>
Average daily blocks | 1x potential revenue | 2x potential revenue<br>
-------+----------------------<wbr>+-----------------------+-----<wbr>------------------<br>
Alice | 5 | 5*12.5*4000 = 250k | 5*12.5*1000 = 62.5k<br>
Bob | 10 | 10*12.5*4000 = 500k | 10*12.5*1000 = 125.0k<br>
Chalie | 25 | 25*12.5*4000 = 1,500k | 25*12.5*1000 = 312.5k<br>
<br>
You can replace "average daily blocks" with "kiloWatt hours (kWh) plus<br>
capital equipment depreciation costs" for a difficulty-neutral factor.<br>
<br>
-Dave<br>
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<br></blockquote></div></div>