[PATCH] pidns: Limit kill -1 and cap_set_all

Kirill Korotaev dev at openvz.org
Mon Oct 29 01:38:01 PDT 2007


I dislike this patch:
it's not scalable/efficient to travers all the tasks
while we know the pid namespace we care about.

Kirill


Eric W. Biederman wrote:
> This patch implements task_in_pid_ns and uses it to limit cap_set_all
> and sys_kill(-1,) to only those tasks in the current pid namespace.
> 
> Without this we have a setup for a very nasty surprise.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm at xmission.com>
> ---
>  include/linux/pid_namespace.h |    2 ++
>  kernel/capability.c           |    3 +++
>  kernel/pid.c                  |   11 +++++++++++
>  kernel/signal.c               |    5 ++++-
>  4 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/include/linux/pid_namespace.h b/include/linux/pid_namespace.h
> index 0227e68..b454678 100644
> --- a/include/linux/pid_namespace.h
> +++ b/include/linux/pid_namespace.h
> @@ -78,4 +78,6 @@ static inline struct task_struct *task_child_reaper(struct task_struct *tsk)
>  	return tsk->nsproxy->pid_ns->child_reaper;
>  }
>  
> +extern int task_in_pid_ns(struct task_struct *tsk, struct pid_namespace *ns);
> +
>  #endif /* _LINUX_PID_NS_H */
> diff --git a/kernel/capability.c b/kernel/capability.c
> index efbd9cd..a801016 100644
> --- a/kernel/capability.c
> +++ b/kernel/capability.c
> @@ -125,6 +125,7 @@ static inline int cap_set_all(kernel_cap_t *effective,
>  			       kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
>  			       kernel_cap_t *permitted)
>  {
> +     struct pid_namespace *pid_ns = current->nsproxy->pid_ns;
>       struct task_struct *g, *target;
>       int ret = -EPERM;
>       int found = 0;
> @@ -132,6 +133,8 @@ static inline int cap_set_all(kernel_cap_t *effective,
>       do_each_thread(g, target) {
>               if (target == current || is_container_init(target->group_leader))
>                       continue;
> +             if (!task_in_pid_ns(target, pid_ns))
> +		     continue;
>               found = 1;
>  	     if (security_capset_check(target, effective, inheritable,
>  						permitted))
> diff --git a/kernel/pid.c b/kernel/pid.c
> index f815455..1c332ca 100644
> --- a/kernel/pid.c
> +++ b/kernel/pid.c
> @@ -430,6 +430,17 @@ struct pid *find_get_pid(pid_t nr)
>  	return pid;
>  }
>  
> +static int pid_in_pid_ns(struct pid *pid, struct pid_namespace *ns)
> +{
> +	return pid && (ns->level <= pid->level) &&
> +		pid->numbers[ns->level].ns == ns;
> +}
> +
> +int task_in_pid_ns(struct task_struct *task, struct pid_namespace *ns)
> +{
> +	return pid_in_pid_ns(task_pid(task), ns);
> +}
> +
>  pid_t pid_nr_ns(struct pid *pid, struct pid_namespace *ns)
>  {
>  	struct upid *upid;
> diff --git a/kernel/signal.c b/kernel/signal.c
> index 1200630..8f5a31f 100644
> --- a/kernel/signal.c
> +++ b/kernel/signal.c
> @@ -1147,10 +1147,13 @@ static int kill_something_info(int sig, struct siginfo *info, int pid)
>  	} else if (pid == -1) {
>  		int retval = 0, count = 0;
>  		struct task_struct * p;
> +		struct pid_namespace *ns = current->nsproxy->pid_ns;
>  
>  		read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
>  		for_each_process(p) {
> -			if (p->pid > 1 && !same_thread_group(p, current)) {
> +			if (!is_container_init(p) &&
> +			    !same_thread_group(p, current) &&
> +			    task_in_pid_ns(p, ns)) {
>  				int err = group_send_sig_info(sig, info, p);
>  				++count;
>  				if (err != -EPERM)



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