[Ksummit-discuss] [CORE TOPIC] Trusted kernel patchset
Matthew Garrett
mjg59 at srcf.ucam.org
Wed May 7 18:03:15 UTC 2014
(Posting as core rather than tech because I suspect this is more
political than technical at this point)
Most major distributions ship these. There is strong demand from Google,
who want to use them in a use-case that has nothing to do with UEFI
Secure Boot. Making a distinction between root and kernel security is a
necessary part of securing a boot chain[1].
Yet, after apparently gaining at least a rough consensus at LPC last
year, we're now at the point where there's yet another suggestion for
how to rewrite them but absolutely nobody showing any signs of being
willing to do that work or any agreement from anyone in the security
community that entirely reworking capabilities is either practical or
desirable.
It'd be nice to have this done before August, but given that all
previous attempts to actually get it unblocked on mailing lists have
failed maybe we should talk about it in person. Again.
[1] See: the large number of people running modified kernels on their
Android devices by using the signed vendor kernel to kexec them. Great
for freedom, bad for the guarantees you were attempting to provide
regarding trusted code
--
Matthew Garrett | mjg59 at srcf.ucam.org
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