<div dir="ltr"><br><br><div class="gmail_quote"><div dir="ltr">On Wed, Nov 7, 2018 at 10:17 PM Anthony Towns <<a href="mailto:aj@erisian.com.au">aj@erisian.com.au</a>> wrote:<br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">On Wed, Nov 07, 2018 at 06:40:13PM -0800, Jim Posen wrote:<br>
> can simply close the channel. So if I'm charging for liquidity, I'd actually<br>
> want to charge for the amount (in mSAT/BTC) times time. <br>
<br>
So perhaps you could make a market here by establishing a channel saying<br>
that<br>
<br>
"I'll pay 32 msat per 500 satoshi per hour for the first 3 days"<br>
<br>
When you open the channel with 500,000 satoshi donated by the other guy,<br>
you're then obliged to transfer 32 satoshi every hour to the other guy<br>
for three days (so a total of 14c or so).<br>
<br>
If the channel fails beforehand, they don't get paid; if you stop<br>
paying you can still theoretically do a mutual close.<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>I think that this can also be gamed by a second, cooperating node that sends payments through the channel to meet the rate and capture the fees for the first. You can make this less likely by charging higher transmission fees that make such an attack infeasible, and it's less 'damaging' than an immediate close in that there's still open capacity available for some time, at least until the 'bogus' payments have drained the capacity that you solicited in the first place.</div><div><br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<br>
Maybe a complicated addition to the protocol though?<br>
<br>
Cheers,<br>
aj<br>
<br>
</blockquote></div></div>