[Bitcoin-development] bitcoin pull requests

Mike Hearn mike at plan99.net
Thu Apr 4 10:04:22 UTC 2013

By the way, I have a download of the Bitcoin-Qt client and signature
verification running in a cron job.

On Thu, Apr 4, 2013 at 10:11 AM, Mike Hearn <mike at plan99.net> wrote:

> My general hope/vague plan for bitcoinj based wallets is to get them all
> on to automatic updates with threshold signatures. Combined with regular
> audits of the initial downloads for new users, that should give a pretty
> safe result that is immune to a developer going rogue.
> On Wed, Apr 3, 2013 at 7:12 PM, grarpamp <grarpamp at gmail.com> wrote:
>> > Users will have available multisig addresses which require
>> > transactions to be signed off by a wallet HSM. (E.g. a keyfob
>> Hardware is a good thing. But only if you do the crypto in the
>> hardware and trust the hardware and its attack models ;) For
>> instance, the fingerprint readers you see everywhere... many
>> of them just present the raw fingerprint scan to the host (and
>> host software), instead of hashing the fingerprint internally and
>> using that as primitive in crypto exchanges with the host. They
>> cheaped out and/or didn't think. So oops, there went both your
>> security (host replay) and your personal privacy (biometrics),
>> outside of your control. All with no protection against physical
>> fingerprint lifting.
>> > This doesn't remove the need to improve repository integrity. ... but
>> > repository integrity is a general problem that is applicable to many
>> > things (after all, what does it matter if you can't compromise Bitcoin
>> > if you can compromise boost, openssl, or gcc?)
>> Yes, that case would matter zero to the end product. However
>> having a strong repo permits better auditing of the BTC codebase.
>> That's a good thing, and eliminates the need to talk chicken and
>> egg.
>> > It's probably best
>> > that Bitcoin specalists stay focused on Bitcoin security measures, and
>> > other people interested in repository security come and help out
>> > improving it.  An obvious area of improvement might be oddity
>> > detection and alerting:  It's weird that I can rewrite history on
>> > github, so long as I do it quickly, without anyone noticing.
>> If no one is verifying the repo, sure, even entire repos could be
>> swapped out for seemingly identical ones.
>> Many repos do not have any strong internal verification structures
>> at all, and they run on filesystems that accept bitrot.
>> Take a look at some OS's... OpenBSD and FreeBSD, supposedly
>> the more secure ones out there... both use legacy repos on FFS.
>> Seems rather ironic in the lol department.
>> Thankfully some people out there are finally getting a clue on these
>> issues, making and learning the tools, converting and migrating
>> things, working on top down signed build and distribution chain, etc...
>> so maybe in ten years the opensource world will be much farther
>> ahead. Or at least have a strong audit trail.
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