[Bitcoin-development] Draft BIP for geutxos message

Mike Hearn mike at plan99.net
Wed Jul 16 12:37:35 UTC 2014

Thanks Jeff.

I do feel like a lot of this is covered in the writeup I attached to the
implementation pull request, and I went over it again in the ensuing
discussion, and also in the BIP.

The discussion of how to make it secure is covered in the "Upgrade" section
of the writeup and in the "Authentication" section of the BIP. Please do
let me know if these sections are missing something. The ideas discussed
there are not implemented in this pull request because outside of some
special cases, it is a very large project that involves a chain fork. You
can see the start of a solution here:


> If one implements your BIP in a naive manner -- simply find a node, and
> issue a single query -- they are dangerously exposed to malicious
> information.  The BIP should describe this major security issue, and
> describe at least one method of solving it (ditto implementation, if
> lighthouse has not already solved this).

The BIP already does discuss this, in the authentication section.
Suggestions for how to make it better are welcome.

> Comparison between this and BIP 35 (mempool command) are not apt, as
> miners and full nodes treat "mempool" returned data just like any other
> randomly solicited "tx" command on the network.  Unlike "mempool" cmd, this
> "getutxos" cmd proffers post-verification trusted data.

I don't think it does proffer that, but if a part of the BIP could be read
as doing so, let me know which part and I'll fix it.
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