[Bitcoin-development] Proposals for improving Bitcoin mining decentralization
rme at i-rme.es
Tue Jun 17 14:01:02 UTC 2014
Because he cant change the coinbase once the proof of work is done.
El 17/06/2014 15:58, "Ron Elliott" <ronaldbelliott at gmail.com> escribió:
> In this scenario how do you ensure the miner solving the block cannot
> reapportion the subsidy to himself rather than the pool?
> On Jun 17, 2014 2:09 AM, "Raúl Martínez" <rme at i-rme.es> wrote:
>> First of all I apologice due to the possible mistakes in my writing
>> below, I am not a Bitcoin developer but I have some knowledge about it.
>> We all know the recent news, Ghash pool controlling 51% of the hashrate.
>> While some consider it a threat others think that is not harmful.
>> The thing is that we have to do something to stop this from happening
>> My proposal is to start thinking about miners that join a pool like
>> independent miners and not slave miners, this includes creating a new
>> mining protocol that does not rely on the pool sending the list of
>> transactions to include in a block. Each individual miner has to collect
>> transactions by his own and mine that, this can be achieved by running a
>> full node or by running a SPV like node that ask other nodes for
>> Once this protocol is developed and standarised we as a community could
>> require all pools to use it (because its better, because is more
>> trustless...), not by imposing it but by recommending it.
>> Pool owners could send some instructions using this protocol to the miner
>> about how many transactions to include per block (some pools want small
>> blocks), how many 0 fee transactions to include, how much is the minimum
>> fee per Kb to include transactions and some info about the Coinbase field
>> in the block.
>> This way is impossible to perform some of the possible 51% attacks:
>> - A pool owner cant mine a new chain (selfish mining) (pool clients
>> have a SPV or full node that has checkpoints and ask other peers about the
>> length of the chain)
>> - A pool owner can't perform double spends or reverse transactions
>> (pool clients know all the transactions relayed to the network, they know
>> if they are already included on a block)
>> - A pool owner cant decide which transactions not to include (but
>> they can configure the minimum fee).
>> - A pool owner cant get all the rewards by avoiding other pools from
>> mining blocks (Because the pool client knows the last block independently
>> that is from his pool or other).
>> The only thing that a 51% pool owner can do is to shut down his pool and
>> drop the hashrate by 51% because he does not control the miners.
>> If the pool owner owns all the hardware in the pool my proposal is not
>> valid, if the pool clients dont use this protocol my proposal is not valid.
>> I want to know if this is possible or its been developed or there is
>> already a working protocol that works like this, also I want to read other
>> people's ways to address this threat, thanks for reading.
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