[Bitcoin-development] New side channel attack that can recover Bitcoin keys

[Eric Lombrozo]

Oh, I absolutely agree that this type of attack is NOT the weakest link in security. There are MANY far easier targets in bitcoind and typical use scenarios of it. If we want to dramatically improve the security of a typical bitcoin wallet, the FLUSH+RELOAD attack is probably not where our efforts would be best rewarded trying to prevent.

However, this thread IS about this particular attack vector - and my suggestion IS specific to this thread.

-Eric Lombrozo


On Mar 5, 2014, at 2:17 PM, James Hartig <fastest963 at gmail.com> wrote:

> On Wed, Mar 5, 2014 at 2:39 PM, Peter Todd <pete at petertodd.org> wrote:
> > More important though is you shouldn't be using single factor Bitcoin
> > addresses. Use n-of-m multisig instead and architect your system such
> > that that every transaction that happens in your service has to be
> > authorized by both the "online" server(s) that host your website as well
> > as a second "hardened" server with an extremely limited interface
> > between it and the online server.
> 
> This adds a very minor amount of security, if any, if someone manages to hack into your "hot wallet" server they can just initiate a non-multisig transaction and still steal all your bitcoins in that wallet. You can't give the argument that the RPC API is password protected because the password is stored in plain-text in the config so all someone has to do is first grep for the file. There doesn't appear to be a way to force ALL outgoing transactions to be multisig and even if there was one, would you be able to force one of the addresses to be the "hardened" server? That still wouldn't prevent anyone from just stopping bitcoind, changing the config, then restarting it.
> 
> Unless you're using your own custom wallet software there doesn't seem to be any sufficient way to prevent someone from stealing all your money once they have access to your server. Other software, like MySQL has access controls so I can prevent ALTERs, DROPs, DELETEs, etc for all "live" accounts limiting the scope of any attack if they manage to get into the server. Maybe this is beyond the scope of bitcoind, not sure.
> 
> Thanks,
> --
> James Hartig
> Software Engineer @ Grooveshark.com
> http://twitter.com/jameshartig
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