[Bitcoin-development] 75%/95% threshold for transaction versions
joseph at lightning.network
Sun Apr 26 06:51:37 UTC 2015
On Sun, Apr 26, 2015 at 03:01:10AM +0300, s7r wrote:
> It's true that malleability is not the end of the world, but it is
> annoying for contracts and micropayment channels, especially refunds
> spending the fund tx before it is even in the blockchain, relying
> solely on its txid.
Agreed, needing the transaction to be signed & broadcastable before the
refunds can be generated is similar to paying for a contract before the
terms have been decided.
> I think we can solve both by using NORMALIZEDTXID - wouldn't this be
> simpler and easier to implement?
The current problem is that SIGHASH_NORMALIZED_TXID as presently
discussed implies stripping the sigScript, which is not sufficient for
the Lightning Network.
The currently discussed SIGHASH_NORMALIZED_TXID does not permit chained
transactions 2 levels deep, which is necessary for Lightning as well.
The path from the Commitment -> HTLC -> Refund requires up to 3 levels
deep of transactions.
Suppose TxA -> TxB -> TxC -> TxD. All outputs are 2-of-2 multisig. TxA
has already entered into the blockchain, the rest have not yet been
broadcast. If TxB spends from TxA, it doesn't need new sighash flags, it
just does a plain SIGHASH_ALL. However, TxC needs
SIGHASH_NORMALIZED_TXID due to malleability risks.
SIGHASH_NORMALIZED_TXID works for TxC because the sigScript can change,
but because TxA's txid has already entered the blockchain, the parent's
input txids cannot change (with high degrees of certainty).
However, with TxD, the txid of TxB may be different, which will result
in an invalid transaction if SIGHASH_NORMALIZED_TXID only strips the
sigScript when obtaining the normalized txid of TxC. The reason for this
is TxC's input txid of TxB has changed (TxC's input 0 txid of TxB)!
Therefore, a functional SIGHASH_NORMALIZED which permits chained
transactions requires the parent transaction's sigScript *AND* txid to
be stripped when determining the parent's normalized txid. Similar to
OP_CHECKSIG, a part of the normalized TXID includes each input's
scriptPubKey, e.g. TxC's normalized TXID includes TxB's scriptPubKey
output which it is spending, so when TxD signs TxC's normalized TXID, it
includes TxB's output (this is a cheap way of increasing uniqueness but
is not an absolute necessity if it's too difficult). All this data
should be immediately available when validating the transaction and
appending it to the UTXO set.
If the txid and sigScript are removed when building the normalized input
txid as part of the spend/signature, it should be possible for chained
transactions to work. However, this isn't absolute security against
replay attacks. If there are two spends with all inputs having the same
values *AND* the same scriptPubKeys per input, then it can be replayed.
The odds of this occurring seems like a sort of uncanny valley of risks;
it's low enough that it shouldn't ever happen which may result in a lack
of documentation, so when it does happen it'll be a big surprise. So,
even if this "safer" method becomes a softfork, perhaps great care
should be taken before making this a default method of spending when the
sighash flag is not an absolute necessity (i.e. "don't do it!" I'm all
in favor of giving this a scary name so developers won't inadvertently
think "hey, normalization sounds like a good thing to do").
That said, it should cover an overwhelming majority of potential
replays, it's nearly impossible to create a "duplicate" replayable tx of
someone *else's* send, since the poteintally "replayable" transaction
signs the sigScript of the redeemed output.
As a side note, SIGHASH_NORMALIZED does not permit spending from any
transaction, which is desirable for the Lightning Network (HTLCs may
persist in new Commitment Transactions). However, this is merely a "nice
to have" and is not an absolute necessity, there is no significant loss
of functionality, merely some slight slowdown from significantly more
signatures. For Lightning in particular, the effect would probably be
batching Commitment Transactions (e.g. 1 mass update per second per
channel), with the only major discernable penalty is an order of
magnitude greater storage of signatures.
Additionally, I think it was Mark Friedenbach who brought up that
SIGHASH_NORMALIZED creates significant complexities with the need for an
additional hash with every UTXO (almost doubling the UTXO set size), and
with nodes which already have UTXO pruning enabled, it'll require
downloading the entire blockchain. I'm not sure if this problem is
insurmountable or not, but if a normalized sighash becomes the most
ideal candidate for a malleability soft-fork, then sooner may be better
than later as more nodes start using the pruning patch.
> Why are we talking about P3SH when we can just upgrade
> P2SH to support additional OP codes?
Assuming you mean the current P2SH scriptPubKey format, it's not
possible to do so while making it a soft fork. If you use OP_EQUAL,
current nodes will treat "P3SH" transactions as P2SH ones.
I'm in favor of keeping P3SH conservative. It's possible to have your
cake and eat it too, by enabling script versions within P3SH.
If you create P3SH as:
OP_DUP <20-byte hash> OP_EQUALVERIFY
The redeemScript has the first byte as a version number, and there is
also an OP_TRUE pushed right before the redeemScript. The scriptSig
would look something like:
<sigs...> OP_TRUE <3 redeemScript>
When executing the script, the last item on the stack verifies against
the hash, then the redeemScript is copied/read, the 3 is popped off
(first byte unsigned int), the OP_TRUE is popped off the stack, and the
script then executes P3SH "version 3" (again, it is the first byte, NOT
an opcode). Any non-known version will return everything as true and not
continue with execution of the script, to permit future soft-forks. The
OP_TRUE is to ensure there is a OP_TRUE left on the stack just in case
for older nodes as this is an EQUALVERIFY.
This works because the address, 20-byte hash, has the 3 version number
as part of the hash, so it is the recipient who determines the version
number. For future soft-forks, it's incredibly flexible, just make the
version byte to 4. Prior addresses work the same, and it's not possible
to accidentally send it using different scripting versions. Perhaps this
can make things upgradeable enough that a malleability sighash flag can
go in sooner rather than later.
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