[bitcoin-dev] Incentives to run full nodes
odinn.cyberguerrilla at riseup.net
Wed Aug 19 05:21:15 UTC 2015
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"Incentivizing the running of full nodes"
(However, the issue to which I referred here is now closed)
View whole thread:
On 08/17/2015 02:44 PM, Chris Pacia via bitcoin-dev wrote:
> On Aug 17, 2015 5:29 PM, "Peter Todd via bitcoin-dev"
> <bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org
> <mailto:bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org>> wrote: From the
> point of view of a
>> wallet, it's not very secure to use Hearn-style SPV mode, and
>> volunteers running full nodes doesn't help things. Sybil
>> attacking the IP address space is pretty easy in comparison to
>> aquiring hashing power sufficient to create false confirmations,
>> so any attacker able to do the former will likely be running the
>> full node you're connecting too anyway. Ultimately, Hearn-style
>> SPV is a close approximation to just trusting anyone with a
>> non-trivial amount of hashing power. (and getting that is
>> surprisingly easy, e.g. w/ SPV mining)
> Can you explain how the spv node fails against an attacker with a
> non-trivial amount of hash power where a full node doesn't? To
> attack an spv wallet that is waiting for 6 or 10 confirmations, you
> would not only need to Sybil them but also summon a massive amount
> of hashing power to create a chain of headers (while forgoing the
> opportunity to mine valid blocks with that hash power).
> But could someone with that much hash power not Sybil a full node
> and give them a chain for valid blocks (but on an orphan fork)? The
> failure model doesn't seem specific to spv to me.
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