[bitcoin-dev] We need to fix the block withholding attack
allen.piscitello at gmail.com
Tue Dec 29 19:25:17 UTC 2015
How could this possibly be enforced?
On Tue, Dec 29, 2015 at 12:59 PM, Dave Scotese via bitcoin-dev <
bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> There have been no decent objections to altering the block-selection
> mechanism (when two block solutions appear at nearly the same time) as
> described at
> Key components are:
> - Compute BitcoinDaysDestroyed using only transactions that have been
> in your mempool for some time as oBTCDD ("old BTCDD").
> - Use "nearly the same time" to mean separated in time by your guess
> of the average duration of block propagation times.
> - When two block solutions come in at nearly the same time, build on
> the one that has the most oBTCDD, rather than the one that came in first.
> The goal of this change is to reduce the profitability of withholding
> block solutions by severely reducing the chances that a block solved a
> while ago can orphan one solved recently. "Came in first" seems more
> easily gamed than "most oBTCDD". As I wrote there, "*old coins* is
> always a dwindling resource and *global nodes willing to help cheat* is
> probably a growing one."
> I will write a BIP if anyone agrees it's a good idea.
> On Mon, Dec 28, 2015 at 12:26 PM, Ivan Brightly via bitcoin-dev <
> bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
>> On Mon, Dec 28, 2015 at 2:12 PM, Peter Todd via bitcoin-dev <
>>> bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
>>> Far more concerning is network propagation effects between large and
>>> small miners. For that class of issues, if you are in an environemnt
>>> where selfish mining is possible - a fairly flat, easily DoS/sybil
>>> attacked network topology - the profitability difference between small
>>> and large miners even *without* attacks going on is a hugely worrying
>>> problem. OTOH, if you're blocksize is small enough that propagation time
>>> is negligable to profitability, then selfish mining attacks with <30%
>>> hashing power aren't much of a concern - they'll be naturally defeated
>>> by anti-DoS/anti-sybil measures.
>> Let's agree that one factor in mining profitability is bandwidth/network
>> reliability/stability. Why focus on that vs electricity contracts or
>> vertically integrated chip manufacturers? Surely, sufficient network
>> bandwidth is a more broadly available commodity than <$0.02/kwh
>> electricity, for example. I'm not sure that your stranded hydroelectric
>> miner is any more desirable than thousands of dorm room miners with access
>> to 10gbit university connections and free electricity.
>> bitcoin-dev mailing list
>> bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org
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