[Bitcoin-development] Proposal to address Bitcoin malware

[Mike Hearn]

TREZOR does not support BIP70. I think they planned to work on it after
multi-sig support, which is now done, so I'm hoping that it's next on their
roadmap.

The signing features of BIP70 have (fortunately!) been implemented by
payment processors quite early, before we really have the client side fully
figured out and implemented. Mobile wallets (Android, iOS) do implement it
and they are reasonably secure, for desktops we need TREZOR and we need the
Bitcoin Authenticator 2-factor wallet to support it. I think they do, but
can't remember exactly. Either they do, or it's on their roadmap.

On Sun, Feb 1, 2015 at 2:31 PM, Martin Habovštiak <
martin.habovstiak at gmail.com> wrote:

> BIP70 is quite safe agains MitB. If user copies URL belonging to other
> merchant, he would see the fact after entering it into his wallet
> application. The only problem is, attacker can buy from the same
> merchant with user's money. (sending him different URL) This can be
> mitigated by merchant setting "memo" to the description of the basket
> and some user info (e.g. address to which goods are sent).
>
> But if whole computer is compromised, you're already screwed. Trezor
> should help, but I'm not sure if it supports BIP70.
>
> 2015-02-01 14:49 GMT+02:00 Brian Erdelyi <brian.erdelyi at gmail.com>:
> >
> > In online banking, the banks generate account numbers.  An attacker
> cannot
> > generate their own account number and the likelihood of an attacker
> having
> > the same account number that I am trying to transfer funds to is low and
> > this is why OCRA is effective with online banking.
> >
> > With Bitcoin, the Bitcoin address is comparable to the recipient’s bank
> > account number.   I now see how an an attacker can brute force the
> bitcoin
> > address with vanitygen.  Is there any way to generate an 8 digit number
> from
> > the bitcoin address that can be used to verify transactions in such a way
> > (possibly with hashing?) that brute forcing a bitcoin address would take
> > longer than a reasonable period of time (say 60 seconds) so a system
> could
> > time out if a transaction was not completed in that time?
> >
> > I’ve also looked into BIP70 (Payment Protocol) that claims protection
> > against man-in-the-middle/man-in-the-browser (MitB) based attacks.  A
> common
> > way to protect against this is with out-of-band transaction verification
> > (
> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Man-in-the-browser#Out-of-band_transaction_verification
> ).
> > I see how BIP 70 verifies the payment request, however, is there any way
> to
> > verify that the transaction signed by the wallet matches the request
> before
> > it is sent to the blockchain (and how can this support out of band
> > verification)?  Perhaps this is something that can only be supported when
> > sending money with web based wallets.
> >
> > Brian Erdelyi
> >
> >
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