[Bitcoin-development] Proposal to address Bitcoin malware

Joel Joonatan Kaartinen joel.kaartinen at gmail.com
Mon Feb 2 20:57:04 UTC 2015

If the attacker has your desktop computer but not the mobile that's acting
as an independent second factor, how are you then supposed to be able to
tell you're not signing the correct transaction on the mobile? If the
address was replaced with the attacker's address, it'll look like
everything is ok.

- Joel

On Mon, Feb 2, 2015 at 9:58 PM, Brian Erdelyi <brian.erdelyi at gmail.com>

> > Confusing or not, the reliance on multiple signatures as offering
> greater security than single relies on the independence of multiple
> secrets. If the secrets cannot be shown to retain independence in the
> envisioned threat scenario (e.g. a user's compromised operating system)
> then the benefit reduces to making the exploit more difficult to write,
> which, once written, reduces to no benefit. Yet the user still suffers the
> reduced utility arising from greater complexity, while being led to believe
> in a false promise.
> Just trying to make sure I understand what you’re saying.  Are you eluding
> to that if two of the three private keys get compromised there is no gain
> in security?  Although the likelihood of this occurring is lower, it is
> possible.
> As more malware targets bitcoins I think the utility is evident.  Given
> how final Bitcoin transactions are, I think it’s worth trying to find
> methods to help verify those transactions (if a user deems it to be
> high-risk enough) before the transaction is completed.  The balance is
> trying to devise something that users do not find too burdensome.
> Brian Erdelyi
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