[Bitcoin-development] Bitcoin at POS using BIP70, NFC and offline payments - implementer feedback

Eric Voskuil eric at voskuil.org
Mon Feb 23 10:08:28 UTC 2015


On 02/23/2015 01:49 AM, Andreas Schildbach wrote:
> I think at this point I'd like to bring back my original suggestion of
> using DHKE (Diffie-Hellman) or simlar. I know we'd still need to
> transmit some secret that could be eavesdropped, 

Hi Andreas,

DHKE will not improve the situation. Either we use a simple method to
transfer a session key or a complex method.

> but at least the session could not be decrypted from recordings.

DHKE doesn't offer greater forward secrecy than private transfer of a
session key, in fact it's lesser.

> Anyway, establishing a "mostly secure" session is clearly an improvement
> to no protection at all. If we can't find a solution to the dilemma of
> how to exchange the secret, I suggest going ahead with what we have and
> make the best from it.

I don't see that there is a dilemma. The current proposal has a
significant privacy problem that can be easily resolved, and the
resolution actually makes the implementation simpler.

e

> On 02/23/2015 08:36 AM, Andy Schroder wrote:
>> I agree that NFC is the best we have as far as a trust anchor that you
>> are paying the right person. The thing I am worried about is the privacy
>> loss that could happen if there is someone passively monitoring the
>> connection. So, in response to some of your comments below and also in
>> response to some of Eric Voskuil's comments in another recent e-mail:
>>
>> Consider some cases:
>>
>> If NFC is assumed private, then sending the session key over the NFC
>> connection gives the payer and the payee assumed confidence that that a
>> private bluetooth connection can be created.
>>
>> If the NFC actually isn't private, then by sending the session key over
>> it means the bluetooth connection is not private. An eavesdropper can
>> listen to all communication and possibly modify the communication, but
>> the payer and payee won't necessarily know if eavesdropping occurs
>> unless communication is also modified (which could be difficult to do
>> for a really low range communication).
>>
>> If we send a public key of the payee over the NFC connection (in place
>> of a session key) and the NFC connection is assumed trusted (and is
>> unmodified but actually monitored by an eavesdropper) and use that
>> public key received via NFC to encrypt a session key and send it back
>> via bluetooth, to then initiate an encrypted bluetooth connection using
>> that session key for the remaining communication, then the payee still
>> receives payment as expected and the payer sends the payment they
>> expected, and the eavesdropper doesn't see anything.
>>
>> If we send a public key of the payee over the NFC connection (in place
>> of a session key) and the NFC connection is assumed trusted (and is
>> actually modified by an eavesdropper) and use that public key received
>> via NFC to encrypt a session key and send it back via bluetooth, to then
>> initiate an encrypted bluetooth connection using that session key for
>> the remaining communication, then the payee receives no payment and the
>> attack is quickly identified because the customer receives no product
>> for their payment and they notify the payee, and hopefully the problem
>> remedied and no further customers are affected. The privacy loss will be
>> significantly reduced and the motive for such attacks will be reduced.
>> It's possible a really sophisticated modification could be done where
>> the attacker encrypts and decrypts the communication and then relays to
>> each party (without them knowing or any glitches detected), but I guess
>> I'm not sure how easy that would be on such a close proximity device?
>>
>> Erick Voskuil mentioned this same problem would even occur if you had a
>> hardwired connection to the payment terminal and those wires were
>> compromised. I guess I still think what I am saying would be better in
>> that case. There is also more obvious physical tampering required to
>> mess with wires.
>>
>> I'm not sure if there is any trust anchor required of the payer by the
>> payee, is there? Eric also mentioned a need for this. Why does the payer
>> care who they are as long as they get a payment received? Just to avoid
>> a sophisticated modification" that I mention above? I can see how this
>> could be the case for a longer range communication (like over the
>> internet), but I'm not convinced it will be easy on really short ranges?
>> It's almost like the attacker would be better off to just replace the
>> entire POS internals than mess with an attack like that, in which case
>> everything we could do locally (other than the payment request signing
>> using PKI), is useless.
>>
>> I'm not a cryptography expert so I apologize if there is something
>> rudimentary that I am missing here.
>>
>> Andy Schroder
>>
>> On 02/22/2015 08:02 PM, Andreas Schildbach wrote:
>>> On 02/23/2015 12:32 AM, Andy Schroder wrote:
>>>> I guess we need to decide whether we want to consider NFC communication
>>>> private or not. I don't know that I think it can be. An eavesdropper can
>>>> place a tiny snooping device near and read the communication. If it is
>>>> just passive, then the merchant/operator won't realize it's there. So, I
>>>> don't know if I like your idea (mentioned in your other reply) of
>>>> putting the session key in the URL is a good idea?
>>> I think the "trust by proximity" is the best we've got. If we don't
>>> trust the NFC link (or the QR code scan), what other options have we
>>> got? Speaking the session key by voice? Bad UX, and can be eavesdropped
>>> as well of course.
>>>
>>>
>>>
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>>
>>
>>
>>
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> 
> 
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