[bitcoin-dev] For discussion: limit transaction size to mitigate CVE-2013-2292
gavinandresen at gmail.com
Tue Jul 21 18:09:19 UTC 2015
On Mon, Jul 20, 2015 at 4:55 PM, Gregory Maxwell <gmaxwell at gmail.com> wrote:
> On Mon, Jul 20, 2015 at 7:10 PM, Gavin Andresen via bitcoin-dev
> <bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> > Mitigate a potential CPU exhaustion denial-of-service attack by limiting
> > the maximum size of a transaction included in a block.
> This seems like a fairly indirect approach. The resource being watched
> for is not the size (otherwise two transactions for 200k would be
> strictly worse than one 200k transactions) but the potential of N^2
> costs related to repeated hashing in checksig; which this ignores.
Yes. The tradeoff is implementation complexity: it is trivial to check
not as trivial to count signature operations, because
doesn't require any context.
But I would REALLY hate myself if in ten years a future version of me was
get consensus to move away from some stupid 100,000 byte transaction size
I imposed to mitigate a potential DoS attack.
So I agree, a limit on sigops is the right way to go. And if that is being
might as well accurately count exactly how many sigops a transaction
requires to be validated...
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