[bitcoin-dev] [BIP] Normalized transaction IDs

Adam Back adam at cypherspace.org
Thu Nov 5 22:29:46 UTC 2015

About the conflicting spends by the private key holder (self signature
malleability) that is in principle kind of fixable.

You make a new pub key type which is r,Q (where r is the DSA signature
component but chosen at key gen time, Q=xG is the pub key, r is point
compressed R = (r,f(r)) = kG ), r is the pre-computable part of an
ECDSA signature (unrelated to the message which can be decided later).

You make a new address type which is a = H(r,Q).

Then you make a new signature type which requires that the r from
sig=(r,s) matches the r committed to in the address.

As the ECDSA signature is s=(H(m)+r*x)/k mod n, if they sign two
different messages with the same r value they reveal the private key
via simultaneous equation, as s=(H(m)+r*x)/k and s'=(H(m')+r*x)/k and
solving k=(H(m)-H(m'))/(s-s') and x=(sk-H(m))/r allowing anyone who
sees both double spends to spend as they can replace the signature
with their own one.  That converts double signatures into miner can

It doesnt necessarily enforce no pubkey reuse (Q), as a=H(r,Q) and
a'=H(r',Q) are different addresses, though it does enforce no
extended-address reuse (H=(r,Q)).
Binary failure address reuse could be an issue.  Puts pressure on
transactional storage on wallets.


On 5 November 2015 at 20:36, Luke Dashjr via bitcoin-dev
<bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> On Thursday, November 05, 2015 3:27:37 PM Jorge Timón wrote:
>> On Tue, Nov 3, 2015 at 11:01 PM, Luke Dashjr via bitcoin-dev
>> <bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
>> > On Tuesday, November 03, 2015 9:44:02 PM Christian Decker wrote:
>> >> So this is indeed a form of desired malleability we will likely not be
>> >> able to fix. I'd argue that this goes more into the direction of
>> >> double-spending than a form of malleability, and is mostly out of scope
>> >> for this BIP. As the abstract mentions this BIP attempts to eliminate
>> >> damage incurred by malleability in the third party modification
>> >> scenario and in the multisig scenario, with the added benefit of
>> >> enabling transaction templating. If we can get the segregated witnesses
>> >> approach working all the better, we don't even have the penalty of
>> >> increased UTXO size. The problem of singlesig users doublespending
>> >> their outputs to update transactions remains a problem even then.
>> >
>> > I don't know what you're trying to say here. Double spending to the same
>> > destination(s) and malleability are literally the same thing. Things
>> > affected by malleability are still just as broken even with this BIP -
>> > whether it is triggered by a third-party or not is not very relevant.
>> I think this is just a terminology confusion.
>> There's conflicting spends of the same outputs (aka unconfirmed
>> double-spends), and there's signature malleability which Segregated
>> Witnesses solves.
>> If we want to define malleability as signature malleability +
>> conflicting spends, then that's fine.
>> But it seems Christian is mostly interested in signature malleability,
>> which is what SW can solve.
>> In fact, creating conflicting spends is sometimes useful for some
>> contracts (ie to cancel the contract when that's supposed to be
>> allowed).
>> Maybe it is "incorrect" that people use "malleability" when they're
>> specifically talking about "signature malleability", but I think that
>> in this case it's clear that we're talking about transactions having
>> an id that cannot be changed just by signing with a different nonce
>> (what SW provides).
> Ok, then my point is that "signature malleability" is not particularly
> problematic or interesting alone, and the only way to get a practically-useful
> solution, is to address all kinds of malleability.
> Luke
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