[bitcoin-dev] p2p authentication and encryption BIPs

[Sergio Demian Lerner]

It seems that every message must be signed (the protocols lacks MACs). This
can be very resource consuming in terms of CPU and bandwidth since most p2p
messages are small.


On Wed, Mar 23, 2016 at 5:36 PM, Tom via bitcoin-dev <
bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:

> On Wednesday 23 Mar 2016 16:24:12 Jonas Schnelli via bitcoin-dev wrote:
> > Hi
> >
> > I have just PRed a draft version of two BIPs I recently wrote.
> > https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/pull/362
>
> I suggest running a spellchecker ;)
>
> Some questions;
>
> * why would you not allow encryption on non-pre-approved connections?
> * we just removed (ssl) encryption from the JSON interface, how do you
> suggest
> this encryption to be implemented without openSSL?
> * What is the reason for using the p2p code to connect a wallet to a node?
> I suggest using one of the other connection methods to connect to the node.
> This avoids a change in the bitcoin protocol for a very specific usecase.
> * Why do you want to do a per-message encryption (wrapping the original)?
> Smaller messages that contain predictable content and are able to be
> matched
> to the unencrypted versions on the wire send to other nodes will open this
> scheme up to various old statistical attacks.
>
> > Responding peers must ignore (banning would lead to fingerprinting) the
> requesting peer after 5 unsuccessfully authentication tries to avoid
> resource
> attacks.
>
> Any implementation of that kind would itself again be open to resource
> attacks.
> Why 5? Do you want to allow a node to make a typo?
>
>
> > To ensure that no message was dropped or blocked, the complete
> communication
> must be hashed (sha256). Both peers keep the SHA256 context of the
> encryption
> session. The complete <code>enc</code> message (leaving out the hash
> itself)
> must be added to the hash-context by both parties. Before sending a
> <code>enc</code> command, the sha256 context will be copied and finalized.
>
> You write "the complete communication must be hashed" and every message
> has a
> hash of the state until it is at that point.
> I think you need to explain how that works specifically.
>
>
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