[bitcoin-dev] Replay attacks make BIP148 and BIP149 untennable

Kekcoin kekcoin at protonmail.com
Wed Jun 7 00:29:08 UTC 2017


Please read my email more carefully; the replay threat would be moot because there would be no alternative chain to replay the TX on, as the non-148 chain would have been reorganized into oblivion.

Sent with [ProtonMail](https://protonmail.com) Secure Email.

-------- Original Message --------
Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Replay attacks make BIP148 and BIP149 untennable
Local Time: June 7, 2017 3:26 AM
UTC Time: June 7, 2017 12:26 AM
From: contact at taoeffect.com
To: Kekcoin <kekcoin at protonmail.com>
Anthony Towns <aj at erisian.com.au>, bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org <bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org>

I don't know what you mean by "render the replay threat moot."

If you don't have replay protection, replay is always a threat. A very serious one.

--
Please do not email me anything that you are not comfortable also sharing with the NSA.

On Jun 6, 2017, at 5:19 PM, Kekcoin <kekcoin at protonmail.com> wrote:

Hmm, that's not the difference I was talking about. I was referring to the fact that using "post-chainsplit coinbases from the non-148 chain" to unilaterally (ie. can be done without action on the 148-chain) taint coins is more secure in extreme-adverserial cases such as secret-mining reorg attacks (as unfeasibly expensive they may be); the only large-scale (>100 block) reorganization the non-148 chain faces should be a resolution of the chainsplit and therefore render the replay threat moot.
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/attachments/20170606/c710f263/attachment-0001.html>


More information about the bitcoin-dev mailing list