[bitcoin-dev] Rebatable fees & incentive-safe fee markets

[Mark Friedenbach]

This is correct. Under assumptions of a continuous mempool model however this should be considered the outlier behavior, other than a little bit of empty space at the end, now and then. A maximum fee rate calculated as a filter over past block rates could constrain this outlier behavior from ever happening too.

> On Sep 29, 2017, at 3:43 AM, Daniele Pinna <daniele.pinna at gmail.com> wrote:
> 
> Maybe I'm getting this wrong but wouldn't this scheme imply that a miner is incentivized to limit the amount of transactions in a block to capture the maximum fee of the ones included?
> 
> As an example, mined blocks currently carry ~0.8 btc in fees right now. If I were to submit a transaction paying 1 btc in maximal money fees, then the miner would be incentivized to include my transaction alone to avoid that lower fee paying transactions reduce the amount of fees he can earn from my transaction alone. This would mean that I could literally clog the network by paying 1btc every ten minutes.
> 
> Am I missing something?
> 
> Daniele