[bitcoin-dev] KETAMINE: Multiple vulnerabilities in SecureRandom(), numerous cryptocurrency products affected.

Mustafa Al-Bassam mus at musalbas.com
Mon Apr 9 21:17:11 UTC 2018

And specifically, here's a version of it that uses Arcfour:

On 09/04/18 22:11, Mustafa Al-Bassam wrote:
> Here's the code in question: https://github.com/jasondavies/jsbn/pull/7
> Best,
> Mustafa
> On 06/04/18 21:51, Matias Alejo Garcia via bitcoin-dev wrote:
>> Source? 
>> On Fri, Apr 6, 2018 at 4:53 PM, ketamine--- via bitcoin-dev
>> <bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org
>> <mailto:bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org>> wrote:
>>     A significant number of past and current cryptocurrency products
>>     contain a JavaScript class named SecureRandom(), containing both
>>     entropy collection and a PRNG. The entropy collection and the RNG
>>     itself are both deficient to the degree that key material can be
>>     recovered by a third party with medium complexity. There are a
>>     substantial number of variations of this SecureRandom() class in
>>     various pieces of software, some with bugs fixed, some with
>>     additional
>>     bugs added. Products that aren't today vulnerable due to moving to
>>     other libraries may be using old keys that have been previously
>>     compromised by usage of SecureRandom().
>>     The most common variations of the library attempts to collect entropy
>>     from window.crypto's CSPRNG, but due to a type error in a comparison
>>     this function is silently stepped over without failing. Entropy is
>>     subsequently gathered from math.Random (a 48bit linear congruential
>>     generator, seeded by the time in some browsers), and a single
>>     execution of a medium resolution timer. In some known configurations
>>     this system has substantially less than 48 bits of entropy.
>>     The core of the RNG is an implementation of RC4 ("arcfour random"),
>>     and the output is often directly used for the creation of private key
>>     material as well as cryptographic nonces for ECDSA signatures. RC4 is
>>     publicly known to have biases of several bits, which are likely
>>     sufficient for a lattice solver to recover a ECDSA private key
>>     given a
>>     number of signatures. One popular Bitcoin web wallet re-initialized
>>     the RC4 state for every signature which makes the biases bit-aligned,
>>     but in other cases the Special K would be manifest itself over
>>     multiple transactions.
>>     Necessary action:
>>       * identify and move all funds stored using SecureRandom()
>>       * rotate all key material generated by, or has come into contact
>>         with any piece of software using SecureRandom()
>>       * do not write cryptographic tools in non-type safe languages
>>       * don't take the output of a CSPRNG and pass it through RC4
>>     -
>>     3CJ99vSipFi9z11UdbdZWfNKjywJnY8sT8
>>     _______________________________________________
>>     bitcoin-dev mailing list
>>     bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org
>>     <mailto:bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org>
>>     https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
>>     <https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev>
>> -- 
>> Matías Alejo Garcia
>> @ematiu
>> Roads? Where we're going, we don't need roads!
>> _______________________________________________
>> bitcoin-dev mailing list
>> bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org
>> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev

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