[bitcoin-dev] KETAMINE: Multiple vulnerabilities in SecureRandom(), numerous cryptocurrency products affected.

Mustafa Al-Bassam mus at musalbas.com
Mon Apr 9 23:39:15 UTC 2018


The original disclosure didn't contain any information about the library
in question, so I did some digging.

I think that the vulnerability disclosure is referring to a pre-2013
version of jsbn, a JavaScript crypto library. Before it used the CSRNG
in the Web Crypto API, it tried to use nsIDOMCrypto, but incorrectly did
a string comparison when checking the browser version.

In practice though, this doesn't really matter, because
navigator.appVersion < "5" returns true anyway for old browsers. The
real issue is that modern browsers don't have window.crypto.random
defined, so Bitcoin wallets using a pre-2013 version of jsbn may not be
using a CSPRNG, when run on a modern browser.

As is noted though, even if a CSPRNG is used, the library passes the
output of the CSPRNG through RC4, which generates some biased bits,
leading to possible private key recovery.


On 09/04/18 22:17, Mustafa Al-Bassam via bitcoin-dev wrote:
>
> And specifically, here's a version of it that uses Arcfour:
> https://gist.github.com/jonls/5230850
>
>
> On 09/04/18 22:11, Mustafa Al-Bassam wrote:
>>
>> Here's the code in question: https://github.com/jasondavies/jsbn/pull/7
>>
>> Best,
>>
>> Mustafa
>>
>>
>> On 06/04/18 21:51, Matias Alejo Garcia via bitcoin-dev wrote:
>>> Source? 
>>>
>>> On Fri, Apr 6, 2018 at 4:53 PM, ketamine--- via bitcoin-dev
>>> <bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org
>>> <mailto:bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org>> wrote:
>>>
>>>     A significant number of past and current cryptocurrency products
>>>     contain a JavaScript class named SecureRandom(), containing both
>>>     entropy collection and a PRNG. The entropy collection and the RNG
>>>     itself are both deficient to the degree that key material can be
>>>     recovered by a third party with medium complexity. There are a
>>>     substantial number of variations of this SecureRandom() class in
>>>     various pieces of software, some with bugs fixed, some with
>>>     additional
>>>     bugs added. Products that aren't today vulnerable due to moving to
>>>     other libraries may be using old keys that have been previously
>>>     compromised by usage of SecureRandom().
>>>
>>>
>>>     The most common variations of the library attempts to collect
>>>     entropy
>>>     from window.crypto's CSPRNG, but due to a type error in a comparison
>>>     this function is silently stepped over without failing. Entropy is
>>>     subsequently gathered from math.Random (a 48bit linear congruential
>>>     generator, seeded by the time in some browsers), and a single
>>>     execution of a medium resolution timer. In some known configurations
>>>     this system has substantially less than 48 bits of entropy.
>>>
>>>     The core of the RNG is an implementation of RC4 ("arcfour random"),
>>>     and the output is often directly used for the creation of
>>>     private key
>>>     material as well as cryptographic nonces for ECDSA signatures.
>>>     RC4 is
>>>     publicly known to have biases of several bits, which are likely
>>>     sufficient for a lattice solver to recover a ECDSA private key
>>>     given a
>>>     number of signatures. One popular Bitcoin web wallet re-initialized
>>>     the RC4 state for every signature which makes the biases
>>>     bit-aligned,
>>>     but in other cases the Special K would be manifest itself over
>>>     multiple transactions.
>>>
>>>
>>>     Necessary action:
>>>
>>>       * identify and move all funds stored using SecureRandom()
>>>
>>>       * rotate all key material generated by, or has come into contact
>>>         with any piece of software using SecureRandom()
>>>
>>>       * do not write cryptographic tools in non-type safe languages
>>>
>>>       * don't take the output of a CSPRNG and pass it through RC4
>>>
>>>     -
>>>     3CJ99vSipFi9z11UdbdZWfNKjywJnY8sT8
>>>     _______________________________________________
>>>     bitcoin-dev mailing list
>>>     bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org
>>>     <mailto:bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org>
>>>     https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
>>>     <https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> -- 
>>> Matías Alejo Garcia
>>> @ematiu
>>> Roads? Where we're going, we don't need roads!
>>>
>>>
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> bitcoin-dev mailing list
>>> bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org
>>> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
>>
>
>
>
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> bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org
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