[bitcoin-dev] Soft-forks and schnorr signature aggregation

Bram Cohen bram at chia.net
Thu Mar 22 00:47:01 UTC 2018


Regarding the proposed segwit v2 with reclaiming most things as
RETURN_VALID, the net result for what's being proposed in the near future
for supporting aggregated signatures in the not-so-near future is to punt.
A number of strategies are possible for how to deal with new opcodes being
added later on, and the general strategy of making unused opcodes be
RETURN_VALID for now and figuring out how to handle it later works for all
of them. I think this is the right approach, but wanted to clarify that it
is in fact the approach being proposed.

That said, there are some subtleties to getting it right which the last
message doesn't really cover. Most unused opcodes should be reclaimed as
RETURN_VALID, but there should still be one OP_NOP and there should be a
'real' RETURN_VALID, which (a) is guaranteed to not be soft forked into
something else in the future, and (b) doesn't have any parsing weirdness.
The parsing weirdness of all the unclaimed opcodes is interesting. Because
everything in an IF clause needs to be parsed in order to find where the
ELSE is, you have a few options for dealing with an unknown opcode getting
parsed in an unexecuted section of code. They are (a) avoid the problem
completely by exterminating IF and MASTing (b) avoid the problem completely
by getting rid of IF and adding IFJUMP, IFNJUMP, and JUMP which specify a
number of bytes (this also allows for script merkleization) (c) require all
new opcodes have fixed length 1, even after they're soft forked, (d) do
almost like (c) but require that on new soft forks people hack their old
scripts to still parse properly by avoiding the OP_ELSE in inopportune
places (yuck!) (e) make it so that the unknown opcodes case a RETURN_VALID
even when they're parsed, regardless of whether they're being executed.

By far the most expedient option is (e) cause a RETURN_VALID at parse time.
There's even precedent for this sort of behavior in the other direction
with disabled opcodes causing failure at parse time even if they aren't
being executed.

A lot can be said about all the options, but one thing I feel like snarking
about is that if you get rid of IFs using MAST, then it's highly unclear
whether OP_DEPTH should be nuked as well. My feeling is that it should and
that strict parsing should require that the bottom thing in the witness
gets referenced at some point.

Hacking in a multisig opcode isn't a horrible idea, but it is very stuck
specifically on m-of-n and doesn't support more complex formulas for how
signatures can be combined, which makes it feel hacky and weird.

Also it may make sense to seriously consider BLS signatures, which have a
lot of practical benefits starting with them being noninteractively
aggregatable so you can always assume that they're aggregated instead of
requiring complex semantics to specify what's aggregated with what. My team
is working on an implementation which has several advantages over what's
currently in the published literature but it isn't quite ready for public
consumption yet. This should probably go on the pile of reasons why it's
premature to finalize a plan for aggregation at this point.
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