[bitcoin-dev] Overhauled BIP151

[Eric Voskuil]

Without commenting on the other merits of either proposal, the addition of the service flag resolves bip151’s previously-discussed lack of backward compatibility.

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> On Sep 3, 2018, at 21:16, Jonas Schnelli via bitcoin-dev <bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> 
> Hi
> 
> During work on the implementation of BIP151 [1] I figured out that the current
> published proposal could be further optimized.
> 
> I wrote an overhauled BIP151 specification with some – partially radical –
> changes.
> 
> Now it’s unclear to me if this should be published under a new BIP nr. or if it
> is acceptable to change the existing 151 proposal.
> If a new BIP number would be required, I think withdrawing BIP151 should be
> done (which somehow indicates we should alter 151).
> 
> The only BIP151 implementation I’m aware of is the one from Armory [2].
> BCoins implementation has been removed [3].
> 
> The new proposal draft is available here:
> https://gist.github.com/jonasschnelli/c530ea8421b8d0e80c51486325587c52
> 
> Major changes
> =============
> - the encryption handshake no longer requires the v1 protocol, it’s a pure
>  32bytes-per-side „pseudorandom" key exchange that happens before anything else.
> - the multi message envelope has been removed.
> - a new NODE_ENCRYPTED service bit
> - the key derivation and what communication direction uses what key is now more
>  specific
> - the length of a packet uses now a 3-byte integer with 23 available bits
> - introduction of short-command-ID (ex.: uint8_t 13 == INV, etc.) which result in
>  some v2 messages require less bandwidth then v1
> - rekeying doesn’t require a message and can be signaled in the most
>  significant bit in the packet-size field
> 
> 
> Points that are in discussion and may be added to the BIP (or to a new one):
> 
> Hybrid NewHope key exchange
> ===========================
> The current ECDH key exchange is vulnerable to Shor’s algorithm and is thus not
> considered quantum-safe.
> Following TORs approach [4] by adding a NewHope [5] key-exchange the handshake
> protocol would very likely make the encryption PQ safe with little costs.
> There is also a straight forward implementation [6] from the NewHope team that
> has been submitted to NIST PQC project.
> 
> Inefficiency of ChaCha20Poly1305 at openssh
> ========================================
> The proposed AEAD could eventually be further optimized.
> ChaCha20Poly1305 at openssh uses at least three rounds of ChaCha20 which
> eventually can be reduced to two (messages below <=64 bytes [inv, ping,
> pong,...] only require one round of ChaCha20, but two for the Poly1305 key and
> the message length encryption where the Poly1305 key chacha round „throws away“
> 32 bytes).
> 
> 
> I would suggest that we don’t rehash discussions about the general
> concept of encrypting the traffic. This has already been discussed [7][8].
> 
> I hope we can limit this thread to discuss further ideas for optimisation as well as
> technical details of the published proposal or its implementation.
> 
> 
> [1] https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/14032
> [2] https://github.com/goatpig/BitcoinArmory/pull/510
> [3] https://github.com/bcoin-org/bcoin/commit/41af7acfd68b0492a6442865afd439300708e662
> [4] https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/isis/torspec.git/plain/proposals/XXX-newhope-hybrid-handshake.txt?h=draft/newhope
> [5] https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/1092
> [6] https://github.com/newhopecrypto/newhope
> 
> [7] https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2017-February/013565.html
> [8] https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2016-June/012826.html
> 
> 
> Thanks
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