[bitcoin-dev] Overview of anti-covert-channel signing techniques

Dustin Dettmer dustinpaystaxes at gmail.com
Mon Mar 23 14:38:45 UTC 2020

Excellent write up, thanks for putting it together.

On Tue, Mar 3, 2020 at 1:47 PM Pieter Wuille wrote:

> When both the HW and the SW are compromised, clearly no security is
> possible,
> as all entities are controlled by the same party in that case.
While all SW being compromised can’t be stopped, splitting the SW over two
stages can dramatically increase your security if both HW & SW are
compromised. You can do that by:

1) When you setup your storage solution (whatever it may be), export the
xpub(s) and verify the receiving addresses match xpubs with external
software before receiving.
2) Generate and export withdrawal transactions offline
3) Verify transactions against the same xpub(s) using external software
4) Upload transactions

This mitigates, I believe, all leak vectors besides k/R hacking and
prechosen entropy.

I made an external tool to just that here:

Would love to add k commitments when (if?) we settle on best practices for
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