[bitcoin-dev] Detailed protocol design for routed multi-transaction CoinSwap appendium
ZmnSCPxj at protonmail.com
Sat Oct 3 13:31:58 UTC 2020
Good morning Chris,
> Looking at these equations, I realize that the incentives against
> post-coinswap-theft-attempt still work even if we set K = 0, because the
> extra miner fee paid by Bob could be enough disincentive.
This made me pause for a moment, but on reflection, is correct.
The important difference here relative to v1 is that the mining fee for the collateralized contract transaction is deducted from the `Jb` input provided by Bob.
> Unlike the v1 protocol, each CoinSwap party knows a different version of
> the contract transactions, so the taker Alice always knows which maker
> broadcast a certain set of contract transactions, and so can always ban
> the correct fidelity bond.
Great observation, and an excellent property to have.
Will go think about this more.
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