Jeremy jlrubin at mit.edu
Thu Sep 3 17:47:35 UTC 2020

It's also not something that's trivial to set up in any scheme because you
have to have an ordering around when you set up the tx intended to be the
inverse lock before you create the tx using it.

@JeremyRubin <https://twitter.com/JeremyRubin>

On Thu, Sep 3, 2020 at 10:34 AM Jeremy <jlrubin at mit.edu> wrote:

> CTV does not enable this afaiu because it does not commit to the inputs
> (otherwise there's a hash cycle for predicting the output's TXID.
> --
> @JeremyRubin <https://twitter.com/JeremyRubin>
> <https://twitter.com/JeremyRubin>
> On Thu, Sep 3, 2020 at 7:39 AM Dmitry Petukhov <dp at simplexum.com> wrote:
>> Just had an idea that an an "inverse timelock" can be made
>> almost-certainly automatic: a revocation UTXO shall become
>> anyone-can-spend after a timeout, and bear some non-dust amount.
>> Before the timelock expiration, it shall be spendable only along with
>> the covenant-locked 'main' UTXO (via a signature or mutual covenant)
>> This way, after a timeout expires, a multitude of entities will be
>> incentivized to spend this UTXO, because this would be free money for
>> them. It will probably be spend by a miner, as they can always replace
>> the spending transaction with their own and claim the amount.
>> After the revocation UTXO is spent, the covenant path that commits to
>> having it in the inputs will be unspendable, and this would effectively
>> constitute an "inverse timelock".
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