[bitcoin-dev] Yesterday's Taproot activation meeting on lockinontimeout (LOT)

[Jorge Timón]

Just to clarify, I'm not saying bitcoin core should maintain the
"oppose proposal" part of the software. presumably people opposing the
change don't want much of the recent software changes anyway.
But perhaps it wouldn't be so bad, to oppose other proposals, perhaps.
I don't expect anyone to want this, but if people want it I offer
myself to code it,
I mean, just imagine that a day after publishing a bitcoin core
release with activation software for taproot some one, let's say in
New York reach an Agreement to "just use the same activation
mechanism, but for our 32 mb hardfork, it's about time, now computers
are 64 bits anyway". How convenient would it be to just cancel that
with 2 lines in bitcoin core?
Not that I think it will be necessary, but perhaps we want it just in case.

On Mon, Feb 22, 2021 at 5:31 PM Jorge Timón <jtimon at jtimon.cc> wrote:
>
> Sorry, I haven't read everything. I just want to say what I think is
> the best option and why.
> Let's say something like 2 years in which miners can signal activation
> after which, the MUST signal it for their blocks to be valid (I think
> this is LOT=true, but I don't remember what LOT stands for).
> Some may argue than it's easier to move from LOT=false to LOT=true
> than viceversa (I think I'm getting this right), but either way
> different clients could interpret things more differently more easily
> and, you know, that's really bad.
> If anyone is against the consensus change itself, what they should do
> is run a client in which the must is turned into a MUST NOT. Whenever
> miners signal activation, blocks aren't valid so that it doesn't
> happen.
> That way both sides can be cleanly separated and both communities
> (assuming there's a community of users opposing the change) can stick
> together with their own in the same chain. That is, having only 2
> chains in total if there are users opposing the change or only one if
> not, but never 2 chains for people who want the change or 2 chains for
> pople who don't want it.
>
> Just my two sats, please nobody ask me "why would anyone oppose
> taproot?" or anything similar. Because I'm trying to generalize here,
> if we're talking about activation, I think the specifics of the change
> are kind of irrelevant.
>
> Separately: thanks to everyone who worked on taproot.
>
>
> On Mon, Feb 22, 2021 at 3:00 PM Matt Corallo via bitcoin-dev
> <bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> >
> >
> >
> > On Feb 22, 2021, at 05:16, Anthony Towns <aj at erisian.com.au> wrote:
> >
> > If a lockinontimeout=true node is requesting compact blocks from a
> > lockinontimeout=false node during a chainsplit in the MUST_SIGNAL phase,
> > I think that could result in a ban.
> >
> > More importantly, nodes on both sides of the fork need to find each other.
> >
> >
> > (If there was going to be an ongoing fork there'd be bigger things to
> > worry about...)
> >
> >
> > I think it should be clear that a UASF-style command line option to allow consensus rule changes in the node in the short term, immediately before a fork carries some risk of a fork, even if I agree it may not persist over months. We can’t simply ignore that.
> >
> > I think the important specific case of this is something like "if a chain
> > where taproot is impossible to activate is temporarily the most work,
> > miners with lockinontimeout=true need to be well connected so they don't
> > end up competing with each other while they're catching back up".
> >
> >
> > Between this and your above point, I think we probably agree - there is material  technical complexity hiding behind a “change the consensus rules“ option. Given it’s not a critical feature by any means, putting resources into fixing these issues probably isn’t worth it.
> >
> > Matt
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