[bitcoin-dev] Inherited IDs - A safer, more powerful alternative to BIP-118 (ANYPREVOUT) for scaling Bitcoin

jlspc jlspc at protonmail.com
Sun Oct 10 22:03:38 UTC 2021


Response to email from Anthony Towns sent on 20210918 at 11:37:40 UTC
==============================================
aj,

Thanks for taking the time to go through my paper on inherited IDs (IIDs). Also, thanks for your concise and accurate description of the IID proposal and the 2Stage channel protocol. I'm glad you feel the 2Stage protocol might be better than eltoo for a two-party channel.

I want to address other parts of the paper that were obviously not as clear, as they led to two important misunderstandings.

First, there is the issue of the use of an operator in the "timeout trees", "update-forest" and "challenge-and-response" factory protocols. While those protocols do include a party that is designated as the "operator", the operator is in no way a trusted party. While it's true that one would prefer an operator that follows the protocol fully and promptly, as that would allow one to keep the protocol off-chain, the operator can never take funds or prevent others from obtaining the funds that are due to them. In fact, this is exactly analogous to the selection of the party with whom one shares a two-party lightning channel. If one views lightning as being trust-free, then one will also view "timeout trees", "update-forest" and "challenge-and-response" to be trust-free.

Second, there is the question of whether or not IIDs can be simulated with anyprevout. I don't believe that they can. Consider for example the case where Alice has an on-chain funding transaction F1 with output F1:0 that will be spent by a (currently off-chain) transaction F2 with output F2:0 that will be spent by a settlement transaction S. Assume further that there is an on-chain control transaction C1 with output C1:0 owned by untrusted operator O, where C1:0 will be spent by a (currently off-chain) transaction C2 with output C2:0 that may, in certain cases, also be spent by S. In particular, assume F1 puts a covenant on F2 such that F2 puts a covenant on S, where the covenant on S can be met by either: A) waiting a CSV delay of one time unit (defined to be long enough to allow a party with a competing transaction to put that competing transaction on-chain first) and then spending only F2:0 (where F2:0 is referenced via IID) and giving ownership of S:0 to Alice, or B) waiting until a CLV reaches time T_lock and then spending both F2:0 and C2:0 (where F2:0 and C2:0 are referenced via IIDs).

Assume that after Alice put F1 on-chain she wants to transfer ownership of the output S:0 to Bob without having to put F2 or S on-chain. She can do this with IIDs as follows. First, Alice asks the untrusted operator O to put C2 on-chain where C2 puts a covenant on S that forces S to spend both F2:0 and C2:0 (where F2:0 and C2:0 are referenced via IIDs) and to give ownership of S:0 to Bob (by making it spendable using Bob's public key).

There are two cases. First, if O promptly puts the desired C2 on-chain, then Alice and Bob can wait until T_lock (while putting nothing else on-chain), at which point Bob can be assured that he owns S:0 (as any attempt by Alice to spend S:0 by meetiing the covenant using case A above can be thwarted by Bob putting S on-chain first using case B above). Second, if O puts a different C2 on-chain, or fails to put any C2 on-chain promptly, Alice can reclaim her funds by putting F2 on-chain, waiting one time window, and then putting S on-chain using case A above.

Thus, IIDs provide a trust-free means for Alice to transfer funds from F1 to a party that is unknown to Alice when she puts F1 on-chain. I see two problems in tryinig to use anyprevout to achieve the same result. First, I don't know of any mechanism by which Alice can create a covenant that F2 puts on S which implements case B above. In some other settings, I can understand how one could use unique single-use keys in place of IID outputs. However, in this setting I don't see how to define a covenant that F2 puts on S that in case B forces the other input to spend C2:0, as signatures that are evaluated in spending F2:0 don't commit to the output scripts of other inputs to S. Second, and more fundamentally, even if one could define a covenant that F2 puts on S in case B forcing the other input to be signed by a single-use key owned by O, that still wouldn't unconditionally transfer ownership to Bob (without putting F2 and S on-chain). That's because in order to have single-use keys play the role of IIDs, they have to truly be single-use and there is no way Bob can know that O won't just sign some other S' that competes with S and sends S':0 to O, thus stealing the funds. Please let me know if I've missed something here.

The example above isn't very useful, as it doesn't cut down on the number of on-chain transactions required to transfer ownership from Alice to Bob. However, it does capture the core functionality that IIDs provide that (I believe) anyprevout does not provide. This functionality is exactly what enables "update-forest" and "challenge-and-response" to allow a single on-chain transaction to transfer ownership of thousands or millions of channels in a trust-free manner, thus accomplishing with one on-chain transaction what would have required thousands or millions of anyprevout transactions (at least as far as I can tell). This is exactly the power of IIDs that I was referring to, and I found surprising that this power was actually the result of restricting how a signed transaction can be used (as compared to a signed transaction that uses anyprevout).

I hope clearing up these two misunderstandings is enough to pique your interest in reading the "timeout trees", "update-forest" and "challenge-and-response" protocols in more detail, as I'd be interested in your expert opinion on them.

My remaining comments are minor compared to the previous ones.
* Regarding the worst-case delay for eltoo-2party vs. 2Stage, I agree that there is no single agreed upon model for analyzing this and opinions may differ. In any case, I think that if one had a nearly-expired HTLC (or if one is setting the lock time for an HTLC) and one could choose between eltoo-2party, where the other party could have thousands or millions of transactions competing with your settlement transaction, and 2Stage, where the other party can have at most one competing transaction, some would prefer 2Stage.
* In comparing eltoo-2party and 2Stage, I was surprised that you didn't consider 2Stage's elimination of watchtowers for one or both parties as being an advantage. I had through that would be a big win in practice.
* Regarding footnote 13's description of OP_CODESEPARATOR, I realize that that footnote does not capture the change made in taproot. I addressed that issue on p. 54 (and explained it in footnote 43), as footnote 13 was designed to explain OP_CODESEPARATOR to those not already familiar with it, while p. 54 was designed for the experts.
* Regarding the new address type for floating transactions mentioned in the paper, thanks for the correction. I'll remove this from the next version.

In summary, the paper shows that:
1) IIDs can be used to eliminate watchtowers for one or both parties in a two-party channel (2Stage),
2) IIDs can be used to create factories that allow very large numbers of new users to obtain bitcoin in a watchtower-free and trust-free manner (timeout trees),
3) IIDs support trust-free factories with unbounded numbers of parties (and channels) that allow the channels to be bought and sold by anyone, including parties not originally in the factory, with a single on-chain transaction, and
4) IIDs achieve these results while using a more constrained, and thus safer, change to Bitcoin than the support for floating transactions.

Are these results of interest?

Thanks,
John

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