[PATCH 2/2] capabilities: introduce per-process capability bounding set (v7)

Andrew Morgan morgan at kernel.org
Fri Nov 16 20:22:42 PST 2007


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1

Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
>> I also think we should use CAP_SETPCAP for the privilege of manipulating
>> the bounding set. In many ways irrevocably removing a permission
>> requires the same level of due care as adding one (to pI).
> 
> Aside from being heavy-handed, it also means that we are restricting the 
> use of per-process capability bounding sets to kernels with file
> capabilities compiled in, right?  Are we ok with that?
> 

I am. :-)

Cheers

Andrew
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: GnuPG v1.2.6 (GNU/Linux)

iD8DBQFHPmyQQheEq9QabfIRAnnbAJ0c22LPNc1EnjWyvR4ZrwcyAiJDrgCeOdTj
TJFJwUK7UMkeX5M9ULzbN44=
=LMQP
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----


More information about the Containers mailing list