[PATCH 8/9] user namespaces: convert several capable() calls

Serge E. Hallyn serge at hallyn.com
Thu Feb 17 07:03:56 PST 2011


CAP_IPC_OWNER and CAP_IPC_LOCK can be checked against current_user_ns(),
because the resource comes from current's own ipc namespace.

setuid/setgid are to uids in own namespace, so again checks can be
against current_user_ns().

Changelog:
	Jan 11: Use task_ns_capable() in place of sched_capable().
	Jan 11: Use nsown_capable() as suggested by Bastian Blank.
	Jan 11: Clarify (hopefully) some logic in futex and sched.c
	Feb 15: use ns_capable for ipc, not nsown_capable

Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn at canonical.com>
---
 ipc/shm.c             |    2 +-
 ipc/util.c            |    5 +++--
 kernel/futex.c        |   11 ++++++++++-
 kernel/futex_compat.c |   11 ++++++++++-
 kernel/groups.c       |    2 +-
 kernel/sched.c        |    9 ++++++---
 kernel/uid16.c        |    2 +-
 7 files changed, 32 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)

diff --git a/ipc/shm.c b/ipc/shm.c
index 7d3bb22..e91e2e9 100644
--- a/ipc/shm.c
+++ b/ipc/shm.c
@@ -773,7 +773,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(shmctl, int, shmid, int, cmd, struct shmid_ds __user *, buf)
 
 		audit_ipc_obj(&(shp->shm_perm));
 
-		if (!capable(CAP_IPC_LOCK)) {
+		if (!ns_capable(ns->user_ns, CAP_IPC_LOCK)) {
 			uid_t euid = current_euid();
 			err = -EPERM;
 			if (euid != shp->shm_perm.uid &&
diff --git a/ipc/util.c b/ipc/util.c
index 69a0cc1..8e7ec6a 100644
--- a/ipc/util.c
+++ b/ipc/util.c
@@ -627,7 +627,7 @@ int ipcperms (struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)
 		granted_mode >>= 3;
 	/* is there some bit set in requested_mode but not in granted_mode? */
 	if ((requested_mode & ~granted_mode & 0007) && 
-	    !capable(CAP_IPC_OWNER))
+	    !ns_capable(current->nsproxy->ipc_ns->user_ns, CAP_IPC_OWNER))
 		return -1;
 
 	return security_ipc_permission(ipcp, flag);
@@ -800,7 +800,8 @@ struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcctl_pre_down(struct ipc_ids *ids, int id, int cmd,
 
 	euid = current_euid();
 	if (euid == ipcp->cuid ||
-	    euid == ipcp->uid  || capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+	    euid == ipcp->uid  ||
+	    ns_capable(current->nsproxy->ipc_ns->user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
 		return ipcp;
 
 	err = -EPERM;
diff --git a/kernel/futex.c b/kernel/futex.c
index b766d28..1e876f1 100644
--- a/kernel/futex.c
+++ b/kernel/futex.c
@@ -2421,10 +2421,19 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(get_robust_list, int, pid,
 			goto err_unlock;
 		ret = -EPERM;
 		pcred = __task_cred(p);
+		/* If victim is in different user_ns, then uids are not
+		   comparable, so we must have CAP_SYS_PTRACE */
+		if (cred->user->user_ns != pcred->user->user_ns) {
+			if (!ns_capable(pcred->user->user_ns, CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
+				goto err_unlock;
+			goto ok;
+		}
+		/* If victim is in same user_ns, then uids are comparable */
 		if (cred->euid != pcred->euid &&
 		    cred->euid != pcred->uid &&
-		    !capable(CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
+		    !ns_capable(pcred->user->user_ns, CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
 			goto err_unlock;
+ok:
 		head = p->robust_list;
 		rcu_read_unlock();
 	}
diff --git a/kernel/futex_compat.c b/kernel/futex_compat.c
index a7934ac..5f9e689 100644
--- a/kernel/futex_compat.c
+++ b/kernel/futex_compat.c
@@ -153,10 +153,19 @@ compat_sys_get_robust_list(int pid, compat_uptr_t __user *head_ptr,
 			goto err_unlock;
 		ret = -EPERM;
 		pcred = __task_cred(p);
+		/* If victim is in different user_ns, then uids are not
+		   comparable, so we must have CAP_SYS_PTRACE */
+		if (cred->user->user_ns != pcred->user->user_ns) {
+			if (!ns_capable(pcred->user->user_ns, CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
+				goto err_unlock;
+			goto ok;
+		}
+		/* If victim is in same user_ns, then uids are comparable */
 		if (cred->euid != pcred->euid &&
 		    cred->euid != pcred->uid &&
-		    !capable(CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
+		    !ns_capable(pcred->user->user_ns, CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
 			goto err_unlock;
+ok:
 		head = p->compat_robust_list;
 		rcu_read_unlock();
 	}
diff --git a/kernel/groups.c b/kernel/groups.c
index 253dc0f..1cc476d 100644
--- a/kernel/groups.c
+++ b/kernel/groups.c
@@ -233,7 +233,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(setgroups, int, gidsetsize, gid_t __user *, grouplist)
 	struct group_info *group_info;
 	int retval;
 
-	if (!capable(CAP_SETGID))
+	if (!nsown_capable(CAP_SETGID))
 		return -EPERM;
 	if ((unsigned)gidsetsize > NGROUPS_MAX)
 		return -EINVAL;
diff --git a/kernel/sched.c b/kernel/sched.c
index 18d38e4..dc12bc2 100644
--- a/kernel/sched.c
+++ b/kernel/sched.c
@@ -4761,8 +4761,11 @@ static bool check_same_owner(struct task_struct *p)
 
 	rcu_read_lock();
 	pcred = __task_cred(p);
-	match = (cred->euid == pcred->euid ||
-		 cred->euid == pcred->uid);
+	if (cred->user->user_ns == pcred->user->user_ns)
+		match = (cred->euid == pcred->euid ||
+			 cred->euid == pcred->uid);
+	else
+		match = false;
 	rcu_read_unlock();
 	return match;
 }
@@ -5088,7 +5091,7 @@ long sched_setaffinity(pid_t pid, const struct cpumask *in_mask)
 		goto out_free_cpus_allowed;
 	}
 	retval = -EPERM;
-	if (!check_same_owner(p) && !capable(CAP_SYS_NICE))
+	if (!check_same_owner(p) && !task_ns_capable(p, CAP_SYS_NICE))
 		goto out_unlock;
 
 	retval = security_task_setscheduler(p);
diff --git a/kernel/uid16.c b/kernel/uid16.c
index 4192098..51c6e89 100644
--- a/kernel/uid16.c
+++ b/kernel/uid16.c
@@ -189,7 +189,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(setgroups16, int, gidsetsize, old_gid_t __user *, grouplist)
 	struct group_info *group_info;
 	int retval;
 
-	if (!capable(CAP_SETGID))
+	if (!nsown_capable(CAP_SETGID))
 		return -EPERM;
 	if ((unsigned)gidsetsize > NGROUPS_MAX)
 		return -EINVAL;
-- 
1.7.0.4



More information about the Containers mailing list