[PATCH 6/6] protect cap_netlink_recv from user namespaces
Serge E. Hallyn
serge.hallyn at canonical.com
Wed Nov 9 14:44:16 UTC 2011
Quoting Eric Paris (eparis at redhat.com):
> On Tue, 2011-11-08 at 03:29 +0000, Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
> > Quoting Eric Paris (eparis at redhat.com):
>
> > But, regardless, your point is valid in that I'm not tightening down as
> > much as I could. So how about I don't change the security_netlink_recv()
> > and callers yet, and instead I change cap_netlink_recv() to do:
> >
> > if (!IN_ROOT_USER_NS && !cap_raised(current_cap(), cap))
>
> Actually better thought. Remove the LSM hook altogether and just use
> capable() in the callers. This hook, being used this way, was
Heh, that sounds terrific! Only concern I have is it will cause
PF_SUPERPRIV to be set when successful, which it didn't use to.
Now it looks like that might be more correct, but it's a change.
Are people who care about accounting stats going to notice and be
surprised?
> introduced in c7bdb545 back when we took the effective perms from the
> skb. We don't use the skb any more since netlink is synchronous. This
> is functionally equivalent except the capabilities code checks against
> the init_user_ns (something we want) and it will now set PF_PRIV (which
> also seems like a good thing) Something like:
>
> security: remove the security_netlink_recv hook as it is equivalent to capable()
>
> Once upon a time netlink was not sync and we had to get the effective
> capabilities from the skb that was being received. Today we instead get
> the capabilities from the current task. This has rendered the entire
> purpose of the hook moot as it is now functionally equivalent to the
> capable() call.
>
> Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis at redhat.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn at ubuntu.com>
thanks,
-serge
>
> ---
>
> drivers/scsi/scsi_netlink.c | 2 +-
> include/linux/security.h | 14 --------------
> kernel/audit.c | 4 ++--
> net/core/rtnetlink.c | 2 +-
> net/decnet/netfilter/dn_rtmsg.c | 2 +-
> net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_queue.c | 2 +-
> net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_queue.c | 2 +-
> net/netfilter/nfnetlink.c | 2 +-
> net/netlink/genetlink.c | 2 +-
> net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c | 2 +-
> security/capability.c | 1 -
> security/commoncap.c | 8 --------
> security/security.c | 6 ------
> security/selinux/hooks.c | 19 -------------------
> 14 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 58 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/drivers/scsi/scsi_netlink.c b/drivers/scsi/scsi_netlink.c
> index 44f76e8..c77628a 100644
> --- a/drivers/scsi/scsi_netlink.c
> +++ b/drivers/scsi/scsi_netlink.c
> @@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ scsi_nl_rcv_msg(struct sk_buff *skb)
> goto next_msg;
> }
>
> - if (security_netlink_recv(skb, CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
> + if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
> err = -EPERM;
> goto next_msg;
> }
> diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
> index 1bb742b..bb7e8a0 100644
> --- a/include/linux/security.h
> +++ b/include/linux/security.h
> @@ -96,7 +96,6 @@ struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx;
> struct seq_file;
>
> extern int cap_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb);
> -extern int cap_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff *skb, int cap);
>
> void reset_security_ops(void);
>
> @@ -798,12 +797,6 @@ static inline void security_free_mnt_opts(struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
> * @skb contains the sk_buff structure for the netlink message.
> * Return 0 if the information was successfully saved and message
> * is allowed to be transmitted.
> - * @netlink_recv:
> - * Check permission before processing the received netlink message in
> - * @skb.
> - * @skb contains the sk_buff structure for the netlink message.
> - * @cap indicates the capability required
> - * Return 0 if permission is granted.
> *
> * Security hooks for Unix domain networking.
> *
> @@ -1564,7 +1557,6 @@ struct security_operations {
> struct sembuf *sops, unsigned nsops, int alter);
>
> int (*netlink_send) (struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb);
> - int (*netlink_recv) (struct sk_buff *skb, int cap);
>
> void (*d_instantiate) (struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode);
>
> @@ -1817,7 +1809,6 @@ void security_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode);
> int security_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, char **value);
> int security_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, void *value, size_t size);
> int security_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb);
> -int security_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff *skb, int cap);
> int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen);
> int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid);
> void security_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen);
> @@ -2505,11 +2496,6 @@ static inline int security_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
> return cap_netlink_send(sk, skb);
> }
>
> -static inline int security_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff *skb, int cap)
> -{
> - return cap_netlink_recv(skb, cap);
> -}
> -
> static inline int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
> {
> return -EOPNOTSUPP;
> diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
> index 2c1d6ab..57e3f51 100644
> --- a/kernel/audit.c
> +++ b/kernel/audit.c
> @@ -601,13 +601,13 @@ static int audit_netlink_ok(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 msg_type)
> case AUDIT_TTY_SET:
> case AUDIT_TRIM:
> case AUDIT_MAKE_EQUIV:
> - if (security_netlink_recv(skb, CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL))
> + if (!capable(CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL))
> err = -EPERM;
> break;
> case AUDIT_USER:
> case AUDIT_FIRST_USER_MSG ... AUDIT_LAST_USER_MSG:
> case AUDIT_FIRST_USER_MSG2 ... AUDIT_LAST_USER_MSG2:
> - if (security_netlink_recv(skb, CAP_AUDIT_WRITE))
> + if (!capable(CAP_AUDIT_WRITE))
> err = -EPERM;
> break;
> default: /* bad msg */
> diff --git a/net/core/rtnetlink.c b/net/core/rtnetlink.c
> index 39f8dd6..98ee1b6 100644
> --- a/net/core/rtnetlink.c
> +++ b/net/core/rtnetlink.c
> @@ -1930,7 +1930,7 @@ static int rtnetlink_rcv_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
> sz_idx = type>>2;
> kind = type&3;
>
> - if (kind != 2 && security_netlink_recv(skb, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
> + if (kind != 2 && !capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
> return -EPERM;
>
> if (kind == 2 && nlh->nlmsg_flags&NLM_F_DUMP) {
> diff --git a/net/decnet/netfilter/dn_rtmsg.c b/net/decnet/netfilter/dn_rtmsg.c
> index 69975e0..1531135 100644
> --- a/net/decnet/netfilter/dn_rtmsg.c
> +++ b/net/decnet/netfilter/dn_rtmsg.c
> @@ -108,7 +108,7 @@ static inline void dnrmg_receive_user_skb(struct sk_buff *skb)
> if (nlh->nlmsg_len < sizeof(*nlh) || skb->len < nlh->nlmsg_len)
> return;
>
> - if (security_netlink_recv(skb, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
> + if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
> RCV_SKB_FAIL(-EPERM);
>
> /* Eventually we might send routing messages too */
> diff --git a/net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_queue.c b/net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_queue.c
> index e59aabd..ffabb26 100644
> --- a/net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_queue.c
> +++ b/net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_queue.c
> @@ -430,7 +430,7 @@ __ipq_rcv_skb(struct sk_buff *skb)
> if (type <= IPQM_BASE)
> return;
>
> - if (security_netlink_recv(skb, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
> + if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
> RCV_SKB_FAIL(-EPERM);
>
> spin_lock_bh(&queue_lock);
> diff --git a/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_queue.c b/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_queue.c
> index e63c397..5e5ce77 100644
> --- a/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_queue.c
> +++ b/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_queue.c
> @@ -431,7 +431,7 @@ __ipq_rcv_skb(struct sk_buff *skb)
> if (type <= IPQM_BASE)
> return;
>
> - if (security_netlink_recv(skb, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
> + if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
> RCV_SKB_FAIL(-EPERM);
>
> spin_lock_bh(&queue_lock);
> diff --git a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink.c b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink.c
> index c879c1a..9da4fc5 100644
> --- a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink.c
> +++ b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink.c
> @@ -130,7 +130,7 @@ static int nfnetlink_rcv_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
> const struct nfnetlink_subsystem *ss;
> int type, err;
>
> - if (security_netlink_recv(skb, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
> + if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
> return -EPERM;
>
> /* All the messages must at least contain nfgenmsg */
> diff --git a/net/netlink/genetlink.c b/net/netlink/genetlink.c
> index 482fa57..05fedbf 100644
> --- a/net/netlink/genetlink.c
> +++ b/net/netlink/genetlink.c
> @@ -516,7 +516,7 @@ static int genl_rcv_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
> return -EOPNOTSUPP;
>
> if ((ops->flags & GENL_ADMIN_PERM) &&
> - security_netlink_recv(skb, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
> + !capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
> return -EPERM;
>
> if (nlh->nlmsg_flags & NLM_F_DUMP) {
> diff --git a/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c b/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c
> index d0a42df..7ea716d 100644
> --- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c
> +++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c
> @@ -2290,7 +2290,7 @@ static int xfrm_user_rcv_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
> link = &xfrm_dispatch[type];
>
> /* All operations require privileges, even GET */
> - if (security_netlink_recv(skb, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
> + if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
> return -EPERM;
>
> if ((type == (XFRM_MSG_GETSA - XFRM_MSG_BASE) ||
> diff --git a/security/capability.c b/security/capability.c
> index 3cf5ae3..5c1aea0 100644
> --- a/security/capability.c
> +++ b/security/capability.c
> @@ -1004,7 +1004,6 @@ void __init security_fixup_ops(struct security_operations *ops)
> set_to_cap_if_null(ops, sem_semctl);
> set_to_cap_if_null(ops, sem_semop);
> set_to_cap_if_null(ops, netlink_send);
> - set_to_cap_if_null(ops, netlink_recv);
> set_to_cap_if_null(ops, d_instantiate);
> set_to_cap_if_null(ops, getprocattr);
> set_to_cap_if_null(ops, setprocattr);
> diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
> index 90fdf97..454e974 100644
> --- a/security/commoncap.c
> +++ b/security/commoncap.c
> @@ -56,14 +56,6 @@ int cap_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
> return 0;
> }
>
> -int cap_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff *skb, int cap)
> -{
> - if (!cap_raised(current_cap(), cap))
> - return -EPERM;
> - return 0;
> -}
> -EXPORT_SYMBOL(cap_netlink_recv);
> -
> /**
> * cap_capable - Determine whether a task has a particular effective capability
> * @cred: The credentials to use
> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
> index 5560472..17ee1c0 100644
> --- a/security/security.c
> +++ b/security/security.c
> @@ -983,12 +983,6 @@ int security_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
> return security_ops->netlink_send(sk, skb);
> }
>
> -int security_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff *skb, int cap)
> -{
> - return security_ops->netlink_recv(skb, cap);
> -}
> -EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_netlink_recv);
> -
> int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
> {
> return security_ops->secid_to_secctx(secid, secdata, seclen);
> diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> index 3deee07..668fe48 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
> +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> @@ -4731,24 +4731,6 @@ static int selinux_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
> return selinux_nlmsg_perm(sk, skb);
> }
>
> -static int selinux_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff *skb, int capability)
> -{
> - int err;
> - struct common_audit_data ad;
> - u32 sid;
> -
> - err = cap_netlink_recv(skb, capability);
> - if (err)
> - return err;
> -
> - COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, CAP);
> - ad.u.cap = capability;
> -
> - security_task_getsecid(current, &sid);
> - return avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_CAPABILITY,
> - CAP_TO_MASK(capability), &ad);
> -}
> -
> static int ipc_alloc_security(struct task_struct *task,
> struct kern_ipc_perm *perm,
> u16 sclass)
> @@ -5477,7 +5459,6 @@ static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
> .vm_enough_memory = selinux_vm_enough_memory,
>
> .netlink_send = selinux_netlink_send,
> - .netlink_recv = selinux_netlink_recv,
>
> .bprm_set_creds = selinux_bprm_set_creds,
> .bprm_committing_creds = selinux_bprm_committing_creds,
>
>
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