CLONE_NEWUSER|CLONE_FS root exploit
Andy Lutomirski
luto at amacapital.net
Thu Mar 14 01:48:23 UTC 2013
On 03/13/2013 11:35 AM, Eric W. Biederman wrote:
> Kees Cook <keescook-F7+t8E8rja9g9hUCZPvPmw at public.gmane.org> writes:
>
>> Hi,
>>
>> It seem like we should block (at least) this combination. On 3.9, this
>> exploit works once uidmapping is added.
>>
>> http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2013/03/13/10
>
> Yes. That is a bad combination. It let's chroot confuse privileged
> processes.
>
> Now to figure out if this is easier to squash by adding a user_namespace
> to fs_struct or by just forbidding this combination.
It's worth making sure that setns(2) doesn't have similar issues.
Looking through other shared-but-not-a-namespace things, there are:
fs_struct: Buggy as noted.
files_struct: Probably harmless -- SCM_RIGHTS can emulate it
signal_struct: This interacts with the tty code. Is it okay?
sighand_struct: Looks safe. Famous last words.
FWIW, I've been alarmed in the past that struct path (e.g. the root
directory) implies an mnt_namespace (hidden in struct mount), and it's
entirely possible for the root directory's mnt_namespace not to match
nsproxy->mnt_namespace. I'm not sure what the implications are, but
this doesn't seem healthy.
--Andy
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