[PATCH v2 00/10] userns: sysctl limits for namespaces

[Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)]

On 26 July 2016 at 18:52, Kees Cook <keescook at chromium.org> wrote:
> On Tue, Jul 26, 2016 at 8:06 AM, Eric W. Biederman
> <ebiederm at xmission.com> wrote:
>> "Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)" <mtk.manpages at gmail.com> writes:
>>
>>> Hello Eric,
>>>
>>> I realized I had a question after the last mail.
>>>
>>> On 07/21/2016 06:39 PM, Eric W. Biederman wrote:
>>>>
>>>> This patchset addresses two use cases:
>>>> - Implement a sane upper bound on the number of namespaces.
>>>> - Provide a way for sandboxes to limit the attack surface from
>>>>   namespaces.
>>>
>>> Can you say more about the second point? What exactly is the
>>> problem that is being addressed, and how does the patch series
>>> address it? (It would be good to have those details in the
>>> revised commit message...)
>>
>> At some point it was reported that seccomp was not sufficient to disable
>> namespace creation.  I need to go back and look at that claim to see
>> which set of circumstances that was referring to.  Seccomp doesn't stack
>> so I can see why it is an issue.
>
> seccomp does stack. The trouble usually comes from a perception that
> seccomp overhead is not trivial, so setting a system-wide policy is a
> bit of a large hammer for such a limitiation. Also, at the time,
> seccomp could be bypasses with ptrace, but this (as of v4.8) is no
> longer true.

Sounds like someone needs to send me a patch for the seccomp.2 man page?

Cheers,

Michael

-- 
Michael Kerrisk
Linux man-pages maintainer; http://www.kernel.org/doc/man-pages/
Linux/UNIX System Programming Training: http://man7.org/training/