[PATCH 1/1] simplified security.nscapability xattr
Eric W. Biederman
ebiederm at xmission.com
Tue May 3 05:54:40 UTC 2016
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge at hallyn.com> writes:
> Quoting Andrew G. Morgan (morgan at kernel.org):
>> I guess I'm confused how we have strayed so far that this isn't an obvious
>> requirement. Uid=0 as being the root of privilege was the basic problem
>> that capabilities were designed to change.
> The task executing the file can be any uid mapped into the namespace. The
> file only has to be owned by the root of the user_ns. Which I agree is
> unfortunate. We can work around it by putting the root uid into the xattr
> itself (which still isn't orthogonal but allows the file to at least by
> owned by non-root), but the problem then is that a task needs to know its
> global root k_uid just to write the xattr.
The root kuid is just make_kuids(user_ns, 0) so it is easy to find.
It might be a hair better to use the userns->owner instead of the root
uid. That would allow user namespaces without a mapped root to still
use file capabilities.
>> Uid is an acl concept. Capabilities are supposed to be independent of that.
>> If we want to support NS file capabilities I would look at replacing the
>> xattr syscall with a dedicated file capabilities modification syscall. Then
> That was one ofthe possibilities I'd mentioned in my earlier proposal,
> fwiw. The problem is if we want tar to still work unmodified then
> simple xattr operations still have to work.
> Maybe there's workable semantics there though. Worth thinking about.
If the problem is compatibilty please look at
posix_acl_fix_xattr_from_user. With something similar for the
security.capability attribute we can perform whatever transformation
makes sense. I admit adding 4 bytes is a bit of a pain in that context
but not a big one.
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