bind mounting namespace inodes for unprivileged users
Eric W. Biederman
ebiederm at xmission.com
Wed May 4 17:43:38 UTC 2016
James Bottomley <James.Bottomley at HansenPartnership.com> writes:
> On Wed, 2016-05-04 at 09:38 -0500, Eric W. Biederman wrote:
>> James Bottomley <James.Bottomley at HansenPartnership.com> writes:
>> > Right at the moment, unprivileged users cannot call mount --bind to
>> > create a permanent copy of any of their namespaces. This is
>> > annoying
>> > because it means that for entry to long running containers you have
>> > to
>> > spawn an undying process and use nsenter via the /proc/<pid>/ns
>> > files.
>> > The first question is: assuming we restrict it to bind mounting
>> > only
>> > nsfs inodes, is there any reason an unprivileged user shouldn't be
>> > able
>> > to bind a namespace they've created to a file they own in the
>> > initial
>> > mount namespace?
>> Own, have read/write and unlink privileges.
>> My big concern would be the fact that a bind mount today makes a file
>> immune from unlink. So it would mess up rm -rf.
> Yes, that's true. You have to unmount a bind mount, even of a file,
> before you can remove it. The way me mostly cope with this today is to
> install the bind mounts on a tmpfs ... however, the unprivileged user
> can't mount a tmpfs either ...
> However, when I experimented, it seems that the rm isn't hard and fast.
> If I create a file outside the mount namespace, but then bind mount it
> within the mount namespace, I can still remove it from the outside, in
> which case the binding also disappears. The is_locally_mounted() check
> in vfs_unlink() returns false because the file isn't covered outside
> the child mount namespace. It doesn't look like too much bother to
> make unlink do the same for bind mounted files regardless of whether
> the mount point is covered by another bind mounted file (although
> obviously keeping the same semantics for directories).
True, althought that will be a potentially long conversation. The
existing semantics were a bug fix for security issues with user
namespaces and mount namespaces. I would have loved not to have
added is_local_mountpoint, but that was the compromise between fixing
the issues and remaining backwards compatible.
>> That might not be worse than what a setuid fuse mount binary allows
> It's about the same: you can't remove the fuse mount point until it
> gets unmounted. If you have gvfs, you can see this by looking at
I don't have it handy and gnome and I parted was several versions ago,
but yes. My point is that the unprivileged fuse case makes a good
precedent and example to follow.
>> I wonder if there might is a way to setup a user namespace and mount
>> namespace combination so users could manage mounts in their own login
>> shells, just like is allowed in plan 9. Long term I think that would
>> be more satisfactory.
> So I thought about this as well. However, you do want a single user
> and mount namespace for all logins, which means it would have to be
> managed by the login process itself. That seemed to be quite a large
> thing to parametrise to login.
No. This can be done with pam. Last I looked there was even a
pam_namespace plugin for dealing with the mount namespace. The only
real issue I can think of is that exec likes to drop capabilities
(unless your uid == 0).
I remember reviewin the kernel's namespace semantics with a nod towards
using them in a pam plugin several years ago, and it should be possible
to have a shared container for all of a persons logins if that is
desired, or a separate container per login if that is desired.
>> > So, does anyone have any strong (or even weak) opinions about this
>> > before I start coding patches?
>> The mount namespace is complex and getting it right is a pain in the
>> rear. So adding yet another path and piece in to the existing
>> complexity makes me cringe a little.
> Yes, well which is worse: having no way to bind unprivileged containers
> without spawning a long running process or having a way to bind them
> which may lead to unremovable files. Since I just use sudo mount -
> -bind anyway for my containers, I don't see the file removal argument
> as too daunting.
So far with setns support I haven't felt the need to bind mount
containers. So I am not certain it is an either or choice.
And of course the other side of the craziness is having a mount point on
a filesystem makes that filesystem unmountable (except for lazy
unmounts). So getting this wrong could affect clean shutdowns and
reboots. Which suggests it may be wise to limit this kind of thing
to a tmpfs like /run/user/<uid>/.
Mostly this is my way of say tread carefully because there be dragons
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