RFC: Audit Kernel Container IDs
Eric W. Biederman
ebiederm at xmission.com
Thu Sep 14 17:33:06 UTC 2017
Richard Guy Briggs <rgb at redhat.com> writes:
> The trigger is a pseudo filesystem (proc, since PID tree already exists)
> write of a u64 representing the container ID to a file representing a
> process that will become the first process in a new container.
> This might place restrictions on mount namespaces required to define a
> container, or at least careful checking of namespaces in the kernel to
> verify permissions of the orchestrator so it can't change its own
> container ID.
Why a u64?
Why a proc filesystem write and not a magic audit message?
I don't like the fact that the proc filesystem entry is likely going to
be readable and abusable by non-audit contexts?
Why the ability to change the containerid? What is the use case you are
thinking of there?
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