[PATCH v6 5/6] binfmt_*: scope path resolution of interpreters

Christian Brauner christian at brauner.io
Sat May 11 17:48:47 UTC 2019


On May 11, 2019 7:43:44 PM GMT+02:00, Linus Torvalds <torvalds at linux-foundation.org> wrote:
>On Sat, May 11, 2019 at 1:31 PM Aleksa Sarai <cyphar at cyphar.com> wrote:
>>
>> Yup, I've dropped the patch for the next version. (To be honest, I'm
>not
>> sure why I included any of the other flags -- the only one that
>would've
>> been necessary to deal with CVE-2019-5736 was AT_NO_MAGICLINKS.)
>
>I do wonder if we could try to just set AT_NO_MAGICLINKS
>unconditionally for execve() (and certainly for the suid case).
>
>I'd rather try to do these things across the board, than have "suid
>binaries are treated specially" if at all possible.
>
>The main use case for having /proc/<pid>/exe thing is for finding open
>file descriptors, and for 'ps' kind of use, or to find the startup
>directory when people don't populate the execve() environment fully
>(ie "readlink(/proc/self/exe)" is afaik pretty common.
>
>Sadly, googling for
>
>    execve /proc/self/exe
>
>does actually find hits, including one that implies that chrome does
>exactly that.  So it might not be possible.
>
>Somewhat odd, but it does just confirm the whole "users will at some
>point do everything in their power to use every odd special case,
>intended or not".
>
>                  Linus

Sadly I have to admit that we are using this.
Also, execveat on glibc is implemented via
/proc/self/fd/<nr> on kernels that do not
have a proper execveat.
See fexecve...

Christian


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