[PATCH v6 6/7] seccomp: Introduce addfd ioctl to seccomp user notifier
Christian Brauner
christian.brauner at ubuntu.com
Tue Jul 7 13:30:49 UTC 2020
On Mon, Jul 06, 2020 at 01:17:19PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
> From: Sargun Dhillon <sargun at sargun.me>
>
> This adds a seccomp notifier ioctl which allows for the listener to
> "add" file descriptors to a process which originated a seccomp user
> notification. This allows calls like mount, and mknod to be "implemented",
This either seems like the wrong description as we're intercepting
mount() and mknod() already and as far as I can tell, addfd is not
needed in any way for them. addfd is targeted at system calls that
themselves would install a file descriptor in the intercepted task, e.g.
open() and accept().
> as the return value, and the arguments are data in memory. On the other
> hand, calls like connect can be "implemented" using pidfd_getfd.
>
> Unfortunately, there are calls which return file descriptors, like
> open, which are vulnerable to ToCToU attacks, and require that the more
Hm, the race is not specific to open though but any syscall and
specifically its bad for those syscalls with pointer arguments where the
supervisor copies out the memory, inspects it, and bases its decision on
them.
> privileged supervisor can inspect the argument, and perform the syscall
> on behalf of the process generating the notification. This allows the
> file descriptor generated from that open call to be returned to the
> calling process.
Hm, maybe change that description to sm like:
The seccomp notifier which was introduced a while back allows for
syscall supervision. It is often used in settings where a supervisising
task emulates syscalls for a supervised task in userspace either to
further restrict it's syscall capabilities or to circumvent kernel
enforced restrictions the supervisor deems safe to lift.
While the seccomp notifier allows for the interception of any syscall
only a certain set of syscalls can be correctly emulated. Over the last
cycles we have done work to reduce the set of syscalls which can't be
emulated with the addition of pidfd_getfd(). With this syscall we are
now able to e.g. intercept syscalls that require the supervisor to
operate on file descriptors of the supervisee such as connect().
However, syscalls that cause new file descriptors to be installed in the
supervisor can currently not be correctly emulated since there is no way
for the supervisor to inject file descriptors into the supervisee. The
new addfd ioctl removes this restriction by allowing the supervisor to
install file descriptors into the intercepted task. By implementing this
feature via seccomp the supervisor effectively instructs the supervisee
to install a set of file descriptors into its own file descriptor table.
With the new addfd extension it is possible to e.g. intercept syscalls
such as open() or accept(). The addfd ioctl allows allows to replace
existing file descriptors in the supervisee. One use-case would be to
replace stdout and stderr of a supervisee with a log file descriptor to
record the supervisees output.
>
> In addition, there is functionality to allow for replacement of specific
> file descriptors, following dup2-like semantics.
>
> The ioctl handling is based on the discussions[1] of how Extensible
> Arguments should interact with ioctls. Instead of building size into
> the addfd structure, make it a function of the ioctl command (which
> is how sizes are normally passed to ioctls). To support forward and
> backward compatibility, just mask out the direction and size, and match
> everything. The size (and any future direction) checks are done along
> with copy_struct_from_user() logic.
>
> As a note, the seccomp_notif_addfd structure is laid out based on 8-byte
> alignment without requiring packing as there have been packing issues
> with uapi highlighted before[1][2]. Although we could overload the
> newfd field and use -1 to indicate that it is not to be used, doing
> so requires changing the size of the fd field, and introduces struct
> packing complexity.
>
> [1]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/87o8w9bcaf.fsf@mid.deneb.enyo.de/
> [2]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/a328b91d-fd8f-4f27-b3c2-91a9c45f18c0@rasmusvillemoes.dk/
> [3]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200612104629.GA15814@ircssh-2.c.rugged-nimbus-611.internal
>
> Suggested-by: Matt Denton <mpdenton at google.com>
> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200603011044.7972-4-sargun@sargun.me
> Signed-off-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun at sargun.me>
> Co-developed-by: Kees Cook <keescook at chromium.org>
> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook at chromium.org>
> ---
> include/uapi/linux/seccomp.h | 22 +++++
> kernel/seccomp.c | 172 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
> 2 files changed, 193 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>
> diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/seccomp.h b/include/uapi/linux/seccomp.h
> index 965290f7dcc2..6ba18b82a02e 100644
> --- a/include/uapi/linux/seccomp.h
> +++ b/include/uapi/linux/seccomp.h
> @@ -113,6 +113,25 @@ struct seccomp_notif_resp {
> __u32 flags;
> };
>
> +/* valid flags for seccomp_notif_addfd */
> +#define SECCOMP_ADDFD_FLAG_SETFD (1UL << 0) /* Specify remote fd */
> +
> +/**
> + * struct seccomp_notif_addfd
> + * @id: The ID of the seccomp notification
> + * @flags: SECCOMP_ADDFD_FLAG_*
> + * @srcfd: The local fd number
> + * @newfd: Optional remote FD number if SETFD option is set, otherwise 0.
> + * @newfd_flags: The O_* flags the remote FD should have applied
> + */
> +struct seccomp_notif_addfd {
> + __u64 id;
> + __u32 flags;
> + __u32 srcfd;
> + __u32 newfd;
> + __u32 newfd_flags;
> +};
> +
> #define SECCOMP_IOC_MAGIC '!'
> #define SECCOMP_IO(nr) _IO(SECCOMP_IOC_MAGIC, nr)
> #define SECCOMP_IOR(nr, type) _IOR(SECCOMP_IOC_MAGIC, nr, type)
> @@ -124,5 +143,8 @@ struct seccomp_notif_resp {
> #define SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_SEND SECCOMP_IOWR(1, \
> struct seccomp_notif_resp)
> #define SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_ID_VALID SECCOMP_IOW(2, __u64)
> +/* On success, the return value is the remote process's added fd number */
> +#define SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_ADDFD SECCOMP_IOW(3, \
> + struct seccomp_notif_addfd)
>
> #endif /* _UAPI_LINUX_SECCOMP_H */
> diff --git a/kernel/seccomp.c b/kernel/seccomp.c
> index 866a432cd746..ee314036e429 100644
> --- a/kernel/seccomp.c
> +++ b/kernel/seccomp.c
> @@ -87,10 +87,42 @@ struct seccomp_knotif {
> long val;
> u32 flags;
>
> - /* Signals when this has entered SECCOMP_NOTIFY_REPLIED */
> + /*
> + * Signals when this has changed states, such as the listener
> + * dying, a new seccomp addfd message, or changing to REPLIED
> + */
> struct completion ready;
>
> struct list_head list;
> +
> + /* outstanding addfd requests */
> + struct list_head addfd;
> +};
> +
> +/**
> + * struct seccomp_kaddfd - container for seccomp_addfd ioctl messages
> + *
> + * @file: A reference to the file to install in the other task
> + * @fd: The fd number to install it at. If the fd number is -1, it means the
> + * installing process should allocate the fd as normal.
> + * @flags: The flags for the new file descriptor. At the moment, only O_CLOEXEC
> + * is allowed.
> + * @ret: The return value of the installing process. It is set to the fd num
> + * upon success (>= 0).
> + * @completion: Indicates that the installing process has completed fd
> + * installation, or gone away (either due to successful
> + * reply, or signal)
> + *
> + */
> +struct seccomp_kaddfd {
> + struct file *file;
> + int fd;
> + unsigned int flags;
> +
> + /* To only be set on reply */
> + int ret;
> + struct completion completion;
> + struct list_head list;
> };
>
> /**
> @@ -793,6 +825,17 @@ static u64 seccomp_next_notify_id(struct seccomp_filter *filter)
> return filter->notif->next_id++;
> }
>
> +static void seccomp_handle_addfd(struct seccomp_kaddfd *addfd)
> +{
> + /*
> + * Remove the notification, and reset the list pointers, indicating
> + * that it has been handled.
> + */
> + list_del_init(&addfd->list);
> + addfd->ret = receive_fd_replace(addfd->fd, addfd->file, addfd->flags);
> + complete(&addfd->completion);
> +}
> +
> static int seccomp_do_user_notification(int this_syscall,
> struct seccomp_filter *match,
> const struct seccomp_data *sd)
> @@ -801,6 +844,7 @@ static int seccomp_do_user_notification(int this_syscall,
> u32 flags = 0;
> long ret = 0;
> struct seccomp_knotif n = {};
> + struct seccomp_kaddfd *addfd, *tmp;
>
> mutex_lock(&match->notify_lock);
> err = -ENOSYS;
> @@ -813,6 +857,7 @@ static int seccomp_do_user_notification(int this_syscall,
> n.id = seccomp_next_notify_id(match);
> init_completion(&n.ready);
> list_add(&n.list, &match->notif->notifications);
> + INIT_LIST_HEAD(&n.addfd);
>
> up(&match->notif->request);
> wake_up_poll(&match->wqh, EPOLLIN | EPOLLRDNORM);
> @@ -821,14 +866,31 @@ static int seccomp_do_user_notification(int this_syscall,
> /*
> * This is where we wait for a reply from userspace.
> */
> +wait:
> err = wait_for_completion_interruptible(&n.ready);
> mutex_lock(&match->notify_lock);
> if (err == 0) {
> + /* Check if we were woken up by a addfd message */
> + addfd = list_first_entry_or_null(&n.addfd,
> + struct seccomp_kaddfd, list);
> + if (addfd && n.state != SECCOMP_NOTIFY_REPLIED) {
> + seccomp_handle_addfd(addfd);
> + mutex_unlock(&match->notify_lock);
> + goto wait;
> + }
> ret = n.val;
> err = n.error;
> flags = n.flags;
> }
>
> + /* If there were any pending addfd calls, clear them out */
> + list_for_each_entry_safe(addfd, tmp, &n.addfd, list) {
> + /* The process went away before we got a chance to handle it */
> + addfd->ret = -ESRCH;
> + list_del_init(&addfd->list);
> + complete(&addfd->completion);
> + }
> +
> /*
> * Note that it's possible the listener died in between the time when
> * we were notified of a respons (or a signal) and when we were able to
> @@ -1069,6 +1131,11 @@ static int seccomp_notify_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
> knotif->error = -ENOSYS;
> knotif->val = 0;
>
> + /*
> + * We do not need to wake up any pending addfd messages, as
> + * the notifier will do that for us, as this just looks
> + * like a standard reply.
> + */
> complete(&knotif->ready);
> }
>
> @@ -1233,12 +1300,107 @@ static long seccomp_notify_id_valid(struct seccomp_filter *filter,
> return ret;
> }
>
> +static long seccomp_notify_addfd(struct seccomp_filter *filter,
> + struct seccomp_notif_addfd __user *uaddfd,
> + unsigned int size)
> +{
> + struct seccomp_notif_addfd addfd;
> + struct seccomp_knotif *knotif;
> + struct seccomp_kaddfd kaddfd;
> + int ret;
> +
> + /* 24 is original sizeof(struct seccomp_notif_addfd) */
> + if (size < 24 || size >= PAGE_SIZE)
> + return -EINVAL;
Hm, so maybe add the following:
#define SECCOMP_NOTIFY_ADDFD_VER0 24
#define SECCOMP_NOTIFY_ADDFD_LATEST SECCOMP_NOTIFY_ADDFD_VER0
and then place:
BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(struct seccomp_notify_addfd) < SECCOMP_NOTIFY_ADDFD_VER0);
BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(struct open_how) != SECCOMP_NOTIFY_ADDFD_LATEST);
somewhere which is what we do for clone3(), openat2() and others to
catch build-time nonsense.
include/uapi/linux/perf_event.h:#define PERF_ATTR_SIZE_VER0 64 /* sizeof first published struct */
include/uapi/linux/sched.h:#define CLONE_ARGS_SIZE_VER0 64 /* sizeof first published struct */
include/uapi/linux/sched/types.h:#define SCHED_ATTR_SIZE_VER0 48 /* sizeof first published struct */
include/linux/fcntl.h:#define OPEN_HOW_SIZE_VER0 24 /* sizeof first published struct */
include/linux/fcntl.h:#define OPEN_HOW_SIZE_LATEST OPEN_HOW_SIZE_VER0
> +
> + ret = copy_struct_from_user(&addfd, sizeof(addfd), uaddfd, size);
> + if (ret)
> + return ret;
> +
> + if (addfd.newfd_flags & ~O_CLOEXEC)
> + return -EINVAL;
> +
> + if (addfd.flags & ~SECCOMP_ADDFD_FLAG_SETFD)
> + return -EINVAL;
> +
> + if (addfd.newfd && !(addfd.flags & SECCOMP_ADDFD_FLAG_SETFD))
> + return -EINVAL;
> +
> + kaddfd.file = fget(addfd.srcfd);
> + if (!kaddfd.file)
> + return -EBADF;
> +
> + kaddfd.flags = addfd.newfd_flags;
> + kaddfd.fd = (addfd.flags & SECCOMP_ADDFD_FLAG_SETFD) ?
> + addfd.newfd : -1;
> + init_completion(&kaddfd.completion);
> +
> + ret = mutex_lock_interruptible(&filter->notify_lock);
> + if (ret < 0)
> + goto out;
> +
> + knotif = find_notification(filter, addfd.id);
> + if (!knotif) {
> + ret = -ENOENT;
> + goto out_unlock;
> + }
> +
> + /*
> + * We do not want to allow for FD injection to occur before the
> + * notification has been picked up by a userspace handler, or after
> + * the notification has been replied to.
> + */
> + if (knotif->state != SECCOMP_NOTIFY_SENT) {
> + ret = -EINPROGRESS;
> + goto out_unlock;
> + }
> +
> + list_add(&kaddfd.list, &knotif->addfd);
> + complete(&knotif->ready);
> + mutex_unlock(&filter->notify_lock);
> +
> + /* Now we wait for it to be processed or be interrupted */
> + ret = wait_for_completion_interruptible(&kaddfd.completion);
> + if (ret == 0) {
> + /*
> + * We had a successful completion. The other side has already
> + * removed us from the addfd queue, and
> + * wait_for_completion_interruptible has a memory barrier upon
> + * success that lets us read this value directly without
> + * locking.
> + */
> + ret = kaddfd.ret;
> + goto out;
> + }
> +
> + mutex_lock(&filter->notify_lock);
> + /*
> + * Even though we were woken up by a signal and not a successful
> + * completion, a completion may have happened in the mean time.
> + *
> + * We need to check again if the addfd request has been handled,
> + * and if not, we will remove it from the queue.
> + */
> + if (list_empty(&kaddfd.list))
> + ret = kaddfd.ret;
> + else
> + list_del(&kaddfd.list);
> +
> +out_unlock:
> + mutex_unlock(&filter->notify_lock);
> +out:
> + fput(kaddfd.file);
> +
> + return ret;
> +}
> +
> static long seccomp_notify_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
> unsigned long arg)
> {
> struct seccomp_filter *filter = file->private_data;
> void __user *buf = (void __user *)arg;
>
> + /* Fixed-size ioctls */
> switch (cmd) {
> case SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_RECV:
> return seccomp_notify_recv(filter, buf);
> @@ -1247,9 +1409,17 @@ static long seccomp_notify_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
> case SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_ID_VALID_WRONG_DIR:
> case SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_ID_VALID:
> return seccomp_notify_id_valid(filter, buf);
> + }
> +
> + /* Extensible Argument ioctls */
> +#define EA_IOCTL(cmd) ((cmd) & ~(IOC_INOUT | IOCSIZE_MASK))
> + switch (EA_IOCTL(cmd)) {
> + case EA_IOCTL(SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_ADDFD):
> + return seccomp_notify_addfd(filter, buf, _IOC_SIZE(cmd));
> default:
> return -EINVAL;
> }
> +#undef EA_IOCTL
Why is this undefed? :)
> }
>
> static __poll_t seccomp_notify_poll(struct file *file,
> --
> 2.25.1
>
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