[Ksummit-discuss] [TECH TOPIC] QR encoded oops for the kernel
Levente Kurusa
levex at linux.com
Mon May 12 16:49:21 UTC 2014
Hi,
On Mon, May 12, 2014 at 11:53:20AM -0400, Jason Cooper wrote:
> On Sun, May 11, 2014 at 07:18:24PM +0200, Levente Kurusa wrote:
> > Hi,
> >
> > On Sun, May 11, 2014 at 06:37:47PM +0200, Laurent Pinchart wrote:
> > > On Sunday 11 May 2014 18:29:18 Levente Kurusa wrote:
> ...
> > > > Not sure about how would we create the bugzilla entry? I mean, which
> > > > section, urgency, etc. how would we decide on those solely based on
> > > > the OOPS? Or should we ask the user to fill it out?
> > >
> > > Filling a complex form on a handheld device can be pretty tedious. A two steps
> > > procedure that would allow entering long text on a real computer could be an
> > > interesting option.
> > >
> >
> > Makes sense.
> >
> > What about only asking for an email address and then sending them
> > an automated message with a link where they can continue to add more
> > information to the report? (i.e. fill out the bugzilla)
>
> Agree.
>
> > I guess we should also be careful with the bugzilla. We really don't
> > want propertiary driver crashes added to the bugzilla automatically.
>
> Correct, but the data is still worth recording.
>
> > Nor do we want the same oops added twice, right?
>
> We don't want two bugzilla entries, but we do want to know how many
> times this event has happened.
>
> > How would we differentiate between the two - essentially the same -
> > oopses?
>
> Hmm, oops cookie? hex string of 32/64 bits read off of the entropy
> pool? This would give us an accurate number of events even if a user
> scans multiple times.
Hmm, I've been wondering about this too. I guess 32 bits are enough to
differentiate between oopses, and adding this to the QR code is
relatively easy as well.
What I wonder is how could we get the server back-end to not
allow the same oopses from bad users.
Having a link like:
oops.kernel.org/submit_oops.php?qr=$ENTROPY$BASE64DATA
would mean that malicious users could edit the $ENTROPY part and
hence effectively report the same oops twice. Maybe some checksum?
Or will it be too much for an already damaged kernel?
Thanks,
Levente Kurusa
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