[Lightning-dev] Loop attack with onion routing..

Rusty Russell rusty at rustcorp.com.au
Tue Aug 25 01:20:50 UTC 2015


Anthony Towns <aj at erisian.com.au> writes:
> On 24 August 2015 at 12:58, Rusty Russell <rusty at rustcorp.com.au> wrote:
> But maybe Dave could have a different key for each channel, and choose them
> independently of his lightning network id as used for routing (and the
> corresponding public key used for onion routing)?

Yep.

> But if the key isn't linked, then Carol could construct her own
> "Carol-in-a-Dave-suit" set of keys, and make a fake "channel closure"
> transaction to convince Bob that Dave was being bad,

As I said before, you could never use this to convince anyone that
anyone was bad anyway.

Maybe Carol ignored Dave's perfectly valid reply.  Maybe Dave didn't
reply.  You can't tell.

> It would cost a
> bitcoin transaction and lock up her bitcoins for the timeout period
> (assuming she never finds out R), though -- but I'm not sure that's enough?

Someone bled (in fees and delayed funds).  That's hopefully enough; at
least it cost them to inconvenience you.

Cheers,
Rusty.


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