[Lightning-dev] [BOLT Draft] Onion Routing Spec

Christian Decker decker.christian at gmail.com
Mon Oct 3 21:34:57 UTC 2016


On Mon, Oct 03, 2016 at 05:21:35PM +0000, Olaoluwa Osuntokun wrote:
> > I think this only works if the on-chain keys are Schnorr, right?
> 
> We'd use the same curve equation and domain parameters as Bitcoin uses
> currently, but would swap out EC-DSA for EC-Schnorr. So as a result,
> pub/priv keys stay the same, meaning the on-chain keys can be used for
> signing/verifying the multi-sign for channel authentication proofs.

So we'd still be using ECDSA for everything that could go to the
bitcoin blockchain, and use Schnorr for all other crypto
primitives. Sounds good to me, if we can be certain that reuse across
different schemes does not open us to new threats.

> > Separating onion privkey allows rotation; only a win if we get forward
> > secrecy (not a win for this node, as much as for the network as a
> > whole).
> 
> Agreed, if we're not initially doing passive (or active) key rotation for
> the onion keys, then coupling the identity and onion keys simplifies the
> code at that level and nixes a few network layer control messages.

I'd argue that rotating the onion key is already valuable in order to
limit the shared secret backlog, allowing us to forget them after a
rotation, even if we don't have forward secrecy. If we can get forward
secrecy as well all the better though :-)

Cheers,
Christian


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